The Revolution of the WethOthers (NosOtros)... Around a Theory of the Real for a Material Historical Politics of Our Times

Ricardo Espinoza
Lolas
Abstract: This article rethinks the human for these times from a theory of the real that is equal to the problems that capitalism, patriarchy and colonialism have generated for us, and in this we can understand how emancipation is possible today. And for this it is postulated that the human itself is the WethOthers, that is, a dynamic sexual, mortal and historical structure that articulates itself in permanent liberating tension. And this is because the real happens as distance, that is, as what allows us to be always in movement, in transit, with each other, with everything, in the real itself; breaking all the limits that seek to enclose us in external and dead categories such as the self or the nation state. To this end, the paper, with the help of Machiavelli, Hegel, Nietzsche, Anzaldúa, etc., indicates that philosophy itself must be thought and designed from a certain line where the Other happens in all its daily fragility; namely, the theoretical and the practical go hand in hand in a scriptural mode that expresses the real as distanica and in this freedom and power as an expression of humans among themselves, although this, at times, is very painful, but unavoidable.

Keywords: real, freedom, power, revolution, Hegel, Nietzsche, Anzaldúa

to my dear polignanesi...
Exergos

“Il moderno Principe, el mito-Principe non può essere una persona reale, un individuo concreto: può essere solo un organismo, un elemento sociale nel quale già abbia inizio il concretarsi di una volontà collectiva riconosciuta e affermatasi parzialmente nell’azione”
Gramsci, Quaderni del carcere...

“Era dunque necessario a Moisè trovare el populo d’Isdrael in Egypto stiavi e oppressi dalla Egizii, accioché quelli, per uscire di servitù, si disponessino a seguirlo. Conveniva che Romulo non capissi in Alba, fusi stato esposto al nascere, a volere che diventassi re di Roma e fondatore di quella patria. Bisognava che Ciro trovassi e’ Persi malcontenti dello imperio de’ Medi, e li Medi mollì e efeminati per la lunga pace. Non possevaTeseo dimonstrare la sua virtù, se non trovava li Ateniesi dispersi. Queste occasioni pertanto feciono questi òmini felici e la eccellente virtù loro fece quella occasione essere conosciuta: donde la loro patria ne fu nobilitata e diventò felicissima”. Maquiavelli, Il Principe...

1 Gramsci 2014, p. 951.
2 Machiavelli 2018, p. 821.
“This Theseus must be generous enough to give the people he has created from scattered villages a share in the whole, because a democratic constitution, like the one Theseus gave to his people, is in itself, in our time and in the great states, a contradiction and, for this reason, this share should be organised. Even if the direction of state power in his hands ensures that he will not be rewarded with ingratitude, as happened to Theseus. Hegel, *The Constitution of Germany*. . .

“To reduce the distance is impossible.” Malabou, *El placer borrado* . . .

**Introduction**

*Theseus fascist or WethOthers?*

When we read Sarah Kane’s *Phaedra’s Love* (1996), we come across that fascist Theseus, the one who does what he wants for the sake of himself under the guise of love for the Other (for the underdog, for the miserable, for the multitude), which is so dear to the fascist himself, for example Mussolini and to all current fascists: from dictators like Pinochet to totalitarian businessmen like Trump via so many politicians like Milei, Meloni, Le Pen, etc. But the obvious question arises: will Boric be a fascist for Chile and Petro for Colombia as Putin is for Russia? How do we know who is the "good" Theseus and not the totalitarian fascist? How do we know that even if Theseus is driven by power (*Macht*), even if he uses violence (*Gewalt*), he is not a fascist? The distinction between power and violence, so dear to social democracy, remains limited in order to understand a Theseus? How does a revolutionary Theseus come about, and not a reformist social democrat or even less a totalitarian fascist? And if Theseus is not a proper name, but lies a function, an operator or, to put it in "Lacanian" terms, Theseus is not someone, but Theseus is a signifier, he is the "Name of Theseus" and so with that, too, we are talking about the real when we speak of "Theseus".

Hegel, following Machiavelli, is very clear in his text on the Constitution (never published) and let us remember part of the exergue of this text: “This Theseus must be generous enough to give the people he has created from scattered villages a share in the whole, because a democratic constitution, like the one Theseus gave to his people, is in itself, in our time and in the great states, a contradiction and, therefore, this share should be organised.” We know from the myths, and from that incredible "biography" written about him by Plutarch (much studied by

4 Malabou 2021, p. 41.
both Machiavelli and Hegel), that Theseus is not just any hero: his Power and violence is radical, he punched to death the Minotaur himself (which is a bestial expression of Dionysos himself and impossible to be killed), he fell in love with the maenad, par excellence, Ariadne (daughter of Minos and Pasiphae, sister of the Minotaur and future companion of the drunken god) and with her thread he was able to get out of the Labyrinth (which was more complex than killing the Minotaur). The seduction of Minos’ daughter was such that she betrayed her entire Minoan world for the love of her Attic hero; however, Theseus also abandoned Ariadne at the behest of Athena herself, he had such power to leave her lamenting on Naxos (in any case it was not so bad for her because she and Dionysos founded the ancient world with their dance). As a Hercules he performed many feats against multiple monsters of the Hellas, and no more and no less founded a united Athens by the hand of the wise, armed and sometimes owlish goddess Athena herself (a queer goddess we would say these days), so he could not stay on Naxos with Ariadne. The great French historian of the ancient world Pierre Grimal puts it this way: „After the death of Aegeus... Theseus assumed power in Attica. His first act was to bring about 'Synecism', that is to say, to unite in a single city the inhabitants, hitherto scattered in the countryside. Athens thus became the capital of the state thus constituted. He endowed it with the essential political buildings: the Pitaneo, the Bule, etc. He instituted the Panathenaean festivals as a symbol of the political unity of Attica. He minted coins, divided society into three classes: nobles, artisans and farmers, and established, broadly speaking, the functioning of democracy as it existed in classical times. He conquered the city of Megara and incorporated it into the state he had created. On the border of the Peloponnese and Attica he erected a stele to mark the boundary of the two countries: on one side, the Dorian, on the other, the Ionian. And just as Herakles had founded the Olympic Games in honour of Zeus, so Theseus instituted, or rather reorganised in Corinth, the Isthmian Games in honour of Posidon“.

If we look at the realisation of Theseus, thanks to Grimal’s synthesis (synthesis of the mythical cycle of the hero expressed in multiple texts, vessels, craters, etc.), we realise that he is not at all a human, let alone a man (in the masculine sense), of flesh and blood. In him there is no Duce, no Führer, no Caudillo, no Liberator, no Dictator, etc., who embodies something in and of himself “essential”. Theseus is no hidden „in itself“ that wants to manifest itself. Theseus does not express the hidden essence of something universal that wants to unveil itself and that carries within itself the totality of something of its own (the monstrous error of the arrogant Heidegger of the 1930s and repeated by many ontological thinkers today, for example, the populists who clamour for a Pablo

Iglesias or a Zelensky or Dugin himself and his love for Putin). In Theseus there is no essence of anything, let alone the essence of a *Heimat* that seeks to be radically expressed (in „Heideggerian“ terms, Theseus brings nothing into presence, because there is nothing in the origin to bring into presence). And, therefore, in the question that lies for Theseus there is at stake something not only political, but a question about the real.

In Theseus, as Machiavelli puts it, fortune materially happens, which then becomes the virtue of some; it is what Hegel calls in the Constitution in a double way to express Machiavelli’s nuance as: *Zufall* and *Notwendigkeit*: „If Machiavelli attributed the fall of Cesare Borgia not only to political errors, but also to the accident (*Zufall*) which, just at the most decisive moment, that of Alexander’s death, prostrated him ill in bed, in the same way we must see, on the other hand, in his fall, a higher necessity (*Notwendigkeit*) which did not allow him to enjoy the fruits of his actions or to exploit them to increase his power, because nature, as it appears in his vices, seems to have destined him rather for an ephemeral brilliance and to be a mere instrument of the foundation of a state“7. Fortune is both accidental and necessary; for fortune already indicates something of the real in its constitutive distance (of all things, and especially of the human) that allows us to see this double dimension. And it is Hegel’s dialectical methodical thought that can make explicit the features described by Machiavelli in his material history of the human at the beginning of the 16th century in that torn Florence, which cannot be articulated as something living, because the Hegelian method8 moves in the very movement of the human among itself and with things; and that movement is part of a way of showing the real in the human itself, even if it is painful for him. And in that this Theseus, who moves in the dialectical tension of the random and the necessary, is the virtuous par excellence, that is, in him power (*Macht*) happens, but as a contemporary Hegel would say, in this virtuous Theseus there is a constituent mode of being that is an expression of the freedom (*Freiheit*) that is at the very basis of this articulation of theory and praxis, so important for the political and a radical expression of the real itself in its constitutive movement at a distance. Theseus is the quintessentially free, more so than Wagner’s own Siegfried (and without any need for the sword of necessity), which is why he moves in constituent power, even when it shows itself as violence (when the streets and squares burn), even if this complicates social democracy, to the various Honneths that we encounter in many places, because it implies that in Hegel social revolt is always thought of as a manifestation of the power of the free (this cannot be accepted, for example, by Pöggeler, and let us not forget his failed text *Machiavelli*...

7 Hegel 1972, p. 125.
8 See, Espinoza 2016.
und Hegel. Macht und Sittlichkeit). We are facing a Hegel far removed from Rosenkranz and thus from Kant and the Prussian and a closed totalitarian state, but we are closer to Georg Lukács (and the brilliant Der Junge Hegel und die Probleme der kapitalistischen Gesellschaft, 1954) and Joachim Ritter (and his brilliant Hegel und die französische Revolution, 1957) and from there to Ripalda, Jameson, Toscano, Ruda, Vieweg, Žižek, Butler, Malabou and so many current thinkers and friends.

Hegel’s Theseus is not someone of flesh and blood, much less someone who embodies anything essential, but neither is Machiavelli’s, although at times Il Principe may lead us to believe that he is someone concrete, but neither is he a manifestation of any Florentine essential or of any original or primordial Florentine people, for he is always a chance that becomes necessary in the light of the radical freedom that opens up the power of the real in the midst of the material socio-historical fabric of one against the other, in the struggle of one against the other. Theseus is neither a totalitarian nor a reformist subject, but neither is he a subject in the sense of being someone, and the keys to this are given by Machiavelli himself in his Discorsi, as Negri realises: “... the republic becomes the body of the prince, the living matter of constituent power. The crisis of political discourse that Machiavelli had experienced between 1512 and 1513, both in the writing of the Libro delle Repubbliche and in his personal life, is theoretically overcome”9. Now Machiavelli’s Theseus, as Hegel knows well three hundred years later, is the republic. The power of the real, freedom is expressed in a foreshortening, in a perspective, in the republic, that is, in the people (or plebs or multitude, the names are various for Machiavelli and indicate certain specific traits in order to show the human that emerges from the freedom of power): “Né si può chiamare in alcun modo, con ragione, una republica inordinata, dove siano tanti esempli di virtù; perché li buon esempli nascano dalla buona educazione; la buona educazione, dalle buone leggi; e le buone leggi, da quelli tumulti che molti inconsideratamente dannano: perché, chi esaminerà bene il fine d’essi non troverà ch’egli abbiano partorito alcuno esilio o violenza in deisfavore del comune bene, ma leggi e ordini in benefici della publica libertà”10.

In the tumult, in the revolt, the people as people express their own real movement (thus transforming the instituted); And this movement indicates to us the arrival of history, the irruption of history, with all the pain that this may entail, but, at the same time, as the irruption of the constituent, of the power of the real as freedom that allows the establishment of a certain type of state that necessarily passes through this popular movement and that destabilises the neurotic establishment...

9 Negri 2015, p. 99.

10 Machiavelli 2018, p. 322.
and that operates as a natural representation of the state of things, since nothing changes and all change is basically “gatopardism” so that nothing changes. From the Prince (better with a lower case “prince”) to the people (better with a capital “People”) is what Machiavelli’s Theseus indicates to us, a people that is given as such in the same revolt (Macht-Gewalt) and that is born in chance itself and then becomes necessary; for example, in Chile, in October 2019 and which generated a constituent process. It was not Gabriel Boric the Theseus of Chile, but the Chileans in their multiple popular expressions who took to the streets and generated a historic change: an irruption of the power of the real in the contingency itself, and with violence, and that sought the common good of all, even of the opponents (and for that it was necessary to dissolve what was established, what was instituted by Pinochet). A state emerges from its foundations and remains alive to the extent that it is always open and in movement, even if it bleeds (if the state is not like that, it must perish, as the young Hegel would say). A state, precarious and contingent, from a logic, feminine, of the not-all (following Lacan and with it Žižek) and in permanent movement is now the place of truth as a process that passes through WethOthers. Hegel, as early as in his Phänomenologie (1807), told us that truth is process; and it is a process, a movement, a historical happening, hand in hand with the confraternity of Dionysos himself, namely the emergence of the people: „Philosophy, on the other hand, does not consider non-essential determination, but insofar as it is essential; its element and its content are not the abstract or unreal, but the real, that which puts itself there and lives in itself, the being there in its concept. It is the process that engenders and runs through its moments, and this movement as a whole constitutes the positive and its truth“¹¹. Theseus cannot be any possible Napoleon (even if a certain Hegel thought so, or Richelieu, who ended up headless and with his beloved cats atrociously dead). Theseus is a signifier that lies the „Name of Theseus“, that is, a function that emerges from a living whole and that does not allow itself to be trapped either in a closed theory of the real, or even less in a reproductive and repetitive praxis that seeks to perpetuate the instituted. Theseus is an operator of the free as a power of the real that opens the labyrinth, from his distance, in which we have lived and, with his fists, destroys that minotaur of an unlived life, of dead work, of dead time: the time of capital. Theseus is an expression of time, of the living time that we give each other, in the revolt itself, so that another time can be created. Theseus is the revolutionary expression of a happening of the living movement of the real and in it of the human. And Gramsci realises this, in the prison of Turi, when he reads Il Prinçipe, and that is why he opens this text in its initial exergue: „Il moderno Prinçipe, el mito-Prinçipe non può essere una persona reale, un individuo concreto:

¹¹ Hegel 1966, pp. 31-32.
può essere solo un organismo, un elemento sociale nel quale già abbia inizio il concretarsi di una volontà collectiva riconosciuta e affermatasi parzialmente nell’azione”12.

And that is why Machiavelli does not get lost, like some current theoreticians of social democracy (and obviously of all forms of being conservative, not to speak of right-wing, because sometimes the term no longer says anything), and Machiavelli tells us categorically that: “... li popoli... benché siano ignoranti, sono capaci della verità”13, because in the people the real happens as distance and that is expressed in that life of the very praxis of every day that somehow raises a certain theory and with it contingent institution to make possible the articulation between all of WethOthers.

2

New concepts for old problems that repeat themselves to us like an unacceptable farce

How to understand in more detail this Theseus as “people“ in these times, without falling into the problems that the concept of the people has brought us since Machiavelli himself, and which have become more acute with the current Populist Theory since Laclau, with all the modifications that his heirs have made to it14. Today, after a pandemic of Covid-19 (but which continues to have all kinds of effects on everyone and on society), the concepts of the human (and of the real itself) of many theoretical frameworks arrive too late or distort the human or misinterpret it as such and cover it up radically (this is constantly done by conservatives, but it is also common practice in many parties and movements that call themselves leftists); these concepts become accomplices of these policies that generate so much rejection and social unrest in many parts of this small planet. And the experience of a 16th century Machiavelli and a 19th century Hegel is repeated, in a way, in the 21st century, where we ask ourselves about this Theseus as a people, but of a people that must be thematised in a more finished form, at the height of these times and with a vision of the real, at the same time, structural as a constitutive and dynamic distance, as movement itself in all its fleeting, contingent becoming, which never closes in any way whatsoever. And far from theories that are no longer valid, because they are part of the

12 Gramsci 2014

13 Machiavelli 2018, p. 322.

14 Populist theories are even postulated without antagonism and thus a liberal populism is re-founded, see Appleton 2022. Or populism is no longer spoken of, because the signifier already indicates fascism or has a bad press, and the term proletariat is used again to give another twist to Spanish populism, which is sinking day by day: Gómez Villar 2022

The Revolution of the WethOthers (NosOtros)...
very problem to be faced and overcome. Today the subject of the real is no longer thought about, only by phenomenologists and ontologists in a rather old-fashioned way, always since Husserl and Heidegger, and speculative realists in a childish way following Badiou and the sciences, but who do not expressly account for the real in its operation in the midst of the very pain of the precariousness of being a human being.

Moreover, there are many key concepts that are no longer critically rethought. One of these concepts that has been radically devalued is the concept of the “people” of the populist Essex School (Laclau, Mouffe, Stavrakakis), which has had an eminently “Peronist and Christian” background for decades, from Argentina (this is how the almost “religious” phenomenon of Maradona and Cristina in Argentina and other parts of Latin America is currently understood: Evo, Pablo Iglesias, Bolsonaro, etc.), but also from Europe: Meloni, Meloni, Mouffe and Mouffe, but also in Europe: Meloni, Le Pen, Putin, Zelensky, etc.) and which has branched out in Europe thanks to Podemos from Spain to other latitudes. He is a concrete saviour Theseus and in him lies the redemption of the universal itself. In this perspective, it fails to understand the human without its sexed differential character, and without the traits of the mortal and historical and, on the contrary, the human is understood as subsumed in the „universal“ category of a people to be constructed (all populism is an ontology) thanks to the new Christ the Saviour; thus there would be a people to come, a people to be configured insofar as it is constructed by means of its demands, when certain humans become aware of their malaise thanks to the caudillo; for this reason populist theory always arrives late to the neighbourhood and only serves at the beginning to channel the malaise and operates as a strategy of power to win votes (hence its two great associated concepts of hegemony and antagonism), but never takes root in the very material life of each of WethOthers; and then, with the eminent failure (because there is no possible redemption of anything and even less mediated by a new Christ), it generates frustration, distrust and it often happens that the populist voter then ends up voting for the ultra-right as is the case of many communists who support Le Pen in France in the 2022 elections, but this happens in many other places. Populism raises up a-historical flesh-and-blood „Theseos“ who want to bring about the salvation of the people in themselves. And the people seek to recognise themselves in this Theseus and thus to be able to be somebody in life, or rather to be successful, namely recognition in this market-world.

Another of the concepts that have become obsolete, and for what I have pointed out, in this pandemic: it is that of „recognition“ of the Frankfurt School already in its Honneth version, namely „optimistic“ with its idea of progress, already in this fourth generation, that is, „pessimistic“ reflecting critically under the eminent catastrophe to come (Hartmut Rosa, Rahel Jaeggi, etc.). Concretely, understanding the human
in relation to the Other, as a mode of recognition between the two, installs a struggle and a competition to „appear“ successful on the planet and ends up transforming the human as a subject who, as an entrepreneur of himself, tirelessly seeks to be recognised, in a way becomes in a certain value, in commodity of oneself (even if in a „stupid and crude“ way), commodity in the market\textsuperscript{15} and, moreover, in this recognition of one with the Other, social democracy will always mediate as the European political institution par excellence, which wants to hegemonise the planet in order to govern and in this way homogenise everyone without any differential; and social democracy is no longer what it was (in the 70s of the last century, that is, the very expression of welfare for all), but is part of the very problem of understanding the European and the human being at the height of the times, that is, as a material differential that constitutes and moves, transits and does not allow itself to be trapped either in the self or in any nation state: we are humans in transit in multiple senses; from LGBTQIA+ sexual diversity to the migrants who constitute us from all the places we arrive: we are mixtures of mixtures and material mixtures, as Gloria Anzaldúa brilliantly points out\textsuperscript{16}.

The same happens with the proposal made by the phenomenological and ontological School of Freiburg centred on Husserl, but especially on Heidegger (although this German philosopher is nowadays quite „cancelled“ due to his ontological foundation of social nationalism that is clearly seen in his Black Notebooks edited by Peter Trawny), that is, to understand the human as an „open“ phenomenon that is opposed to the determinations of a closed and modern „I“; and with this the human is radically reduced in its very materiality, it is not studied as an animal that has evolved under material conditions over centuries and millennia, but as a categorical or ontological element that in itself opens up from the real itself, „the“ being, without any mediation whatsoever, and this today is totally madness because it leaves us with nothing to do and only waiting for a „God to save us“, as Heidegger pointed out to Der Spiegel, interviewed in 1966 and published when he died in 1976 (this is one of the serious problems of Chul-Han and of many ontologists, whether believers or atheists, of which there are many everywhere, in different philosophical academies). And, in the same way, psychoanalysis comes very late today, by establishing the analytical understanding of the human (and with it a cure) from a sexuation normalised from the theory of the phallus, castration and edification in the essential difference of genders (Freud), but centred from the masculine itself and this is done by means of the psychic structure of neurosis (the last Christian and capitalist residue that lives in Freudian

\textsuperscript{15} See, Brown 2017.

\textsuperscript{16} See, Anzaldúa 1987.
psychoanalytic theory born at the end of the 19th century); and thus, for example, the classical Freudian psychoanalyst does not know what to do with the feminine, nor does the sexed feminine allow itself to be radically symbolised in a certain Parisian psychoanalytic school (Lacan and Miller): the school of the symbolic, but so little with the clinic of psychosis so typical of the teaching of the real can be given not only with the feminine itself, but with the human (Lacan’s greatest achievement was what he did in Seminar 20, 1972-1973, Even and pushed the psychoanalytic to the limit of the possible); and so it is left without understanding, these days, let alone dealing with major problems of anguish, for example, rethinking the human, and in it the cure, as queer, trans, etc. It is about new human ways of being that coexist in neighbourhoods with each other, in sexual diversity through which some bodies fit together with others in their own singularities in order to be at ease (and thus to affirm life) and thus to be fulfilled in the midst of this flat neurotic capitalist world that operates, as Hegel would say, as a „natural representation“.

In short, we find WethOthers with an insufficient framework of interpretation of the real and the human (but one that refuses to disappear or change), in the face of the complex developments of the human in our times, both at the level of concepts and methodologically: these theoretical frameworks do not express us in what we are and cannot give a more finished expression of the real. Machiavelli tried his best to show the human in a Florentine material history and to indicate certain features of it, in the 16th century, but it is not enough for our times either; the same is true of everything that Hegel has done since the 19th century and that its effects reach our days via Marx, Lenin, Adorno, Lukács, Jameson, Žižek, Butler, etc., but we must go a step further at the level of concepts. For, as I have said, the existing concepts are inadequate to express the human in its radical material and contingent becoming that constitutes itself from an Other that perforates it as real. And with respect to methodology, one perceives the inadequacy of each of the ways of approaching the problem of the human by expressing it from one of these theories alone, in a unilateral, abstract way and without the development of a theory of the real today; and so such theories always arrive too late to the problems that we live among WethOthers in these times that are similar to the problems of the 16th century in Florence, but that are updated at the height of the times and a long time has passed and the material passage in our bodies has been tremendous, continues and will not stop.

17 “If we think we see a man dressed as a woman or a woman dressed as a man, then we are taking the first term of each of these perceptions as the ‘reality’ of gender: the gender that is introduced by simile has no ‘reality’, and is an illusory figure. In perceptions where an apparent reality is linked to an unreality, we think we know what the reality is, and we take the second appearance of the genus to be mere artifice, play, falsehood and illusion. However, what is the sense of ‘gendered reality’ that thus gives rise to such a perception?”. Butler 2007, p. 27.
WethOthers with Hegel, but hand in hand with the dancing thinker Nietzsche to think the real

Faced with the possible social and institutional collapse that this human tide is provoking throughout the capitalist world (so well described since almost a century by Fisher, Žižek, Butler, Jameson, etc.), furthermore, because of the occurrence of this new pandemic and the strengthening of capitalism, the challenge is to see the need for the transformation of the epistemological framework of the conception of the human and the real, which was what Hegel did already at the beginning of the 19th century against all of kantism in its various manifestations (Fichte, Jacobi, Hölderlin, Schelling, etc.). The current concepts that shape the state of the art both in philosophy in general and in social and political philosophy (and also a certain psychoanalysis of the symbolic, cultural studies of the 1980s, certain feminisms such as that of identity, etc.) are still in force, certain feminisms such as that of identity or essence) have remained anchored in „stale“ or useless forms to articulate an ethical-political thought capable of responding to this problem that urges us day by day as inhabitants of this small interconnected planet, in tension and, at the same time, in permanent fragmentation (Machiavelli’s world is repeated to us, not like a ghost, but like a nightmare, and it pursues us). The need to change the interpretative framework of the human and thus of the real itself, in order to bring the institution closer to humans (because we must have some kind of institutionality), as Esposito would say, a biopolitical institution, to a new understanding of our being, of the human as an animal / differential (a free animal at a distance): sexual, mortal and historical, and constituted with the Other in a dynamic and mediated tension in its territory, is fundamental. Nietzsche puts it beautifully and metaphorically in aphorism & 60: „Women and their action at a distance“ from The Gay Science: „Have I still ears? Am I only ears and nothing more? Here I am in the midst of the burning breaker, whose white flames rise up to lick my feet: - from all sides come towards me howls, threats, cries, shrillness, while in the deepest depth the old earth-shaker sings his aria [seine Arie singt], hoarse as a bellowing bull: and at the same time sets an earth-shaker’s rhythm that makes even these monstrous rocks tempered in storms tremble their hearts in their bodies. Then, suddenly, as if born out of nothing, there appears before the portal of this hellish labyrinth, a few fathoms away, - a great sailing ship, gliding silently like a ghost. Oh, that spectral beauty! With what enchantment it catches me!“18. In that distance, it is the mythical distance of Ariadne (the feminine), which mobilises the bull Dionysos. The human, as an animal, sets out as such (steps out of himself) from the very structural distance that constitutes him, that is, the very freedom of

18 Nietzsche 2014, p. 769.
the real; although such freedom causes him much fear and the distance
generates a perforation of the human, it is itself what allows the animal
human to become what he has to be (as Pindar-Nietzsche would say),
that is, a human in and for the Other, even if that Other is part of the very
problem that radically frightens him. This human animality that expresses
itself in this radical finitude, through the freedom in distance as real that
constitutes it, pulsates physically in this differentiality. And it pulsates
in and through the Other, any Other. The very distance of the real: it is our
radical sexualised mortality.

And Zubiri, the Spanish philosopher, points out something similar
(against Heidegger and the phenomenologists and ontologists because
they think of the human without body and animality), and he says it in this
technical way: “For this reason, what can never happen to an animal, to
feel lost in things, can happen to man.... Only man can remain without
disorder, lost in things themselves, lost therefore not in the disorder
of his responses but in the estrangement of what is felt“19. The human
lives his own animal body at a distance from all things, and from the
very real of things, that is, at a distance from things themselves; And
this is how the human lives, his own radical animality, and it cannot be
otherwise, because, as Nietzsche would say, „in spite of“ this painful
distance, because it indicates to us the very openness of everything and
the assured essential meaninglessness of nothing, least of all of the
human (no religion or ideology can save us from this profound truth),
it is because of this that the human can transform all things and in this
himself: Formally freeing himself, even though he knows he is mortal,
finite, this very thing makes it possible for him to go out of himself,
that is, the sex in actu exercito of one with the other. This physical and
real moment of the human being’s radical estrangement is the basis of
every possible revolution, which both Machiavelli and Hegel saw in their
respective times. And this is how the Theseus of the Others can emerge
in these times and which is always actualised for us; it is a Theseus,
an animal in distance, not only mortal, sexual, but eminently historical
distance from one another.

This structural and dynamic triad, in distance, that I propose to
understand the human as: sexual, mortal and historical (and that in an
external way Machiavelli thought it and in a reflexive way Hegel turned
it), is expressed today not as an individuality that interacts with Other
individuality (the liberalism of capitalism always sneaks in through some
crack; even Agamben gets it through his thoughts), but as a material and
virtually mediatised socio-historical fabric (by all means of interaction
from texts to images and digitalisation; from Machiavelli’s letters and
books to today’s Instagram and social networks); such mediation is
expressed dynamically anchored to well-determined territories; it is no

longer possible to speak abstractly in any possible way. And the signifier “human“ expresses „human“ and, in turn, „human“ indicates determined territories dynamically open²⁰ in freedom; never closed or totalising territories.

Finding new conceptual and methodological tools that are adapted to the permanent emergence of a new human that emerges (the best way to understand and update Nietzsche today and make him part of our Critical Theory) have made certain conceptual ways of articulating theories with respect to the praxis in which we live (which was Machiavelli’s great legacy and Hegel half realised it in the Phänomenologie, but especially brilliantly in the Wissenschaft and, in particular, in his third book of 1816: Die Lehre vom Begriff; a text that allows us to understand his Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, 1820, with that masterly Preface that opens the book); all theory goes hand in hand with praxis, and it is praxis that opens up theory and makes it always contingent and precarious (it arrives late, as Hegel says, but it arrives all the same), but not unnecessarily, quite the contrary, because it allows us to think the present, this here (this Rhodes, as Hegel says in the Preface), in this Dionysian dance of life that is slipping through our hands. This is what Machiavelli tried to do over and over again five centuries ago, and it is what we have to do today in the face of our problems. And it is what Gramsci is very clear about, imprisoned and ill in Turi: “Si giunge così anche all'eguaglianza o equazione tra 'filosofia e politica', tra pensiero e azione, cioè ad una filosofia de la praxis. T utto è politica, anche la filosofia o le filosofie... e la sola 'filosofia' è la storia in atto, cioè è la vita stessa”²¹.

3 WethOthers... this is how we revolutionise ourselves today

For this, the philosophical concept that I propose to carry it out is, as I have said, and I have already been using it in this own writing, is that of „NosOtros“ and I have been working on it for many years and which is synthesised in my latest books (Espinoza Lolas, Capitalismo y empresa. Hacia una Revolución del NosOtros, 2018 and NosOtros. Manual to Dissolve Capitalism, 2019)²². This “NosOtros” could be expressed in English as “WethOthers” (following Carlos Gómez Camarena’s translation for the first Routledge edition of: The Marx and Lacan Vocabulary, where I wrote the Revolution entry)²³. This concept expresses


²¹ Gramsci 2014, p. 886.

²² Espinoza 2022.

²³ See Soto van der Plas et al 2022.
the human today in the real itself as distance as it happens materially; and allows us to understand this new way of being that has risen rapidly in pandemic across Europe, the planet; and this human, who is WethOthers, is here to stay.

The philosophical construct of “WethOthers” allows us, contrary to certain theories, to look at the human materially and from a conception of the real: an animal perforated in its stimulus, expelled from the animal paradise of stimuli that assures us how we should behave, then at a distance from things and therefore free (even if this causes dread for the human animal). And in this we see, as I have already indicated above, a double dimension: one structural and the other dynamic (synchronic and diachronic at the same time). On the structural side, the human animal that radically emerges in these times of capitalism and pandemic is sexed (our bodies materially pulsate in a constitutive passivity and activity): hence we are all queer or if we want to pervert the very limits that are imposed on us as if they were absolutely determined), something of this drive was studied by Freud and psychoanalysis since Die Traumdeutung of 1900 (although it was published in 1899) as the very material and constitutive element of the human animal (against all centuries-old European interpretation of the “spiritual” character of the human as self, spirit, conscience, etc., which denied the materiality of the human as ‘self, spirit, conscience, etc. which denied the materiality of the human being in its pulsar, in its sexuality24 and, moreover, against every religious ideological vision to subjugate and dominate the human being). It is mortal (we are finite and radically expired), as Heidegger studied in an existential analytical, that is, ontological way in his Sein und Zeit of 1927 (but it is a human that is neither born nor materially has a body and, therefore, neither suffers, nor feeds, nor gets sick, nor is it a work force, nor dies like animals) and, finally, it is historical (our only transcendence is that of the human), it is historical (our only transcendence is the immanent sediment of layers and layers of human residue, of human logics that are passed and passed through, like mud, without ever avoiding the pain to the Other that this brings about, a history that constitutes us) as the twilight Adorno, one who no longer believes in revolution, radically showed in his Negative Dialektik of 1966. The human is sexed, mortal and historical, but this is not enough to realise what we are as a Theseus of the Self in the 21st century, because we need to understand ourselves dynamically; this is where everything that we are today as animals in free distance is at stake.

A human among Other humans and, in this dynamic tension (a way of understanding the perverse beyond neurosis and classical psychoanalysis and as a dynamic operator of what we are:

24 “The unconscious is a thought process, and it is ‘sexualized’ from within, so to say”, as Ruda and Hamza masterfully point out to Zupančič 2019, p. 440.
revolutionaries), the human is no longer viewed from any category associated with the self (we are out of the Labyrinth of Modernity), because any attempt to imprison it in some prison is doomed to failure, and neither can it be imprisoned in the trap of the nation state (Hegel clearly realised this, and remained faithful to it, in his revolutionary character); This is why the Dieter Henrich edition of the Grundlinien is important to understand that Hegel was never a Prussian to the end) and that what was known in Latin America, in Africa, in the East and now also in Europe is a fact: multiple nations and no state, multiple humans without nations, etc. We humans are a mixture of mixtures in the midst of the real as distance, and this has been seen and experienced in every European neighbourhood for many centuries, and the same in the East and in Latin America, not to mention the Anglo-Saxon world of the USA and the UK. It is human in differential tension at a distance and in mixture with Others, it is free par excellence, it is an expression of power (Macht), even of violence (Gewalt) and it does not allow itself to be trapped in any categorisation (it perverts all the laws that are imposed on it in a naturalised way). It is not, then, the power (freedom) of Theseus as Theseus, which never allows itself to be expressed in what Agamben thinks of as a certain way of happening in and of itself, nor like Balibar who seeks a correlative sphere to find power and the human, nor like Negri who tries to construct this power from life itself, as if this were something, a kind of substratum.

The human in its sexuation, in its mortality, in its history goes with other humans articulated in a constitutive way, therein lies its freedom and therein lies the constituent power of the real. This Other that constitutes us gives us a dynamic characteristic: we are always in transit of its own and we cannot not be; we are human in „trans“ and for this reason I do not believe it is necessary to write the signifier „NosOttrxs“ (in Spanish) with „X“ or another way of expressing the differential (I see it as an error of a certain heideggerianism that wants to express the differential trace itself and that perforates the Derrideans). The human is in itself a socio-historical material fabric insofar as it is free and, at times, violent; in this dynamism, in this plasticity, the human animal happens today in a free distance and happens with the Other insofar as it is revolutionary. And it happens as a living and tense dynamic structure that expresses itself materially in its territories, which we can glimpse through public spaces, through social networks, through works of art, through aesthetic expressions that express the bodies, our „unconscious“; Technologists, network users, artists operate as an essential part of this mediation that makes it possible for us to see how this WethOthers happens today in the midst of a territory determined by material conditions, by multiple traces, tattoos, revolutionary flags, songs, couplings of bodies and between bodies; by a certain pain or trauma that constitutes it and that, at the same time, operates as a
moment that is assumed and never completely resolved, that is dragged along as a certain „remainder“. And nowadays, in short, this materiality of the human animal is mediatised along with art by the virtual itself, from the Mass Media to the social networks, passing through the Smartphone and its power of material digitalisation.

4  
We, the mortal, sexed and historical animals who are coupled with each other: we love each other politically, but with Sade.

The human being is an animal at a distance, that is, free (hence its dread of existence unlike other animals), structurally mortal, sexed and historical, but at the same time it is dynamically a social fabric that lives and builds tensely and sometimes violently a present; and is thus bound to a past that sustains it and opens itself to a future to come. The material structure, without any sense of the real, of the human animal is eminently temporal in its dynamism. A temporality that, by mediating us with one another, constructs us sexually free and differential, as Butler points out very well in her 1999 book *Gender Trouble* (although Butler herself had to correct her book due to the criticisms that were made of it, because it seemed to defend a certain essentialism of gender) and, at the same time, in this mediatised dynamism we are also ideologised, our unconscious is totally captured and it is in this capitalist ideologisation, it is its truth, as Žižek constantly points out in all his work, as in his now classic *The Sublime Object of Ideology* of 1989. And that’s why art and current social technologies in some of their manifestations, but even in the capitalist botch-ups (such as Facebook), serve us to see what we are as WethOthers today; and in this way to be able to revolutionise the establishment in which we live (in that naturalised symbolic that operates by neurotising us and dictates to us like a “father” what to do, what to think and what to expect): We are emancipatory “trans” perverts who, from the streets, whether empirical or virtual, rise up with each other, sometimes in permanent struggle, not only to resist all capitalist, patriarchal, colonial normalisation, but to insist on and revolutionise the system itself. This was clearly seen in the work of the Chilean artists Las Tesis and their critique of the state through the performance “Un violador en tu camino” (inspired by the work of Rita Segato).

This human, free and suffering, structural and dynamic animal that inhabits concrete material territories (and that always inhabits them mediated by the virtual that constitutes and empowers it) behaves like an animal that has to realise its own freedom (this is the great theme of Machiavelli and Hegel), as Xavier Zubiri emphatically points out in

25 See, Castells 2009.
his Trilogy of *Sentient Intelligence: Intelligence and Reality; Intelligence and Logos* and *Intelligence and Reason* of 1980-1983. We are in a material phenomenology, which embodies Heideggerian ontology. Zubiri, like a Spanish Deleuze, but more conceptual in his work, like Spinoza, shows us how the human is the realisation of the freedom of the real in the midst of all the complexities of the human and to some extent thanks to it. Herein lies his problem as a human animal, which is becoming more acute today: how does this human animal organise itself freely with others and accept its radical differential that constitutes it without allowing violence to act among WethOthers? Is it possible for freedom as power to be non-violent? If the State violates us, a certain State, with its mythical violence, a State that is We WethOthers as a mere us that violates us and synthesises us in order to govern us as a herd and in this we are sodomised so that we produce in the normalised machinery of the production and distribution of capital, of colonial subjugation and patriarchal domination, we are left with this animality of this Treatise, we are left with the animality of this Theseus of the Others that is actualised in the skin and there, in the bodies, is the violence that Benjamin called messianic, but which in truth has nothing theological about it, but rather the immanence of bodies sexually, mortally and historically coupled with one another, we see a violence that emerges and says Nietzscheanly: Yes, again! And in this actualisation, the instituted is partly dissolved and space is made for the construction of new values.

This requires the design and implementation of new territorial spaces, new modes of interaction, collaboration and social deliberation that rearticulate the sexed, mortal and historical human as a socio-historical material fabric from the smallest to the largest community scales: from the differential marginalities to the everyday relationships of all kinds that occur, for example, in the neighbourhood. And it is from these socio-historical relationships that the processes of belonging to the territories, to the neighbourhoods, and the well-being and life in common of the “WethOthers” are generated, but never without conflict; to postulate this is really absurd and shows that we know nothing about the human, neither before nor now, and that we do not understand how the real operates as distance and in it freedom and power. All idealisation of the human, against which Machiavelli and Gramsci have always fought, must fall under its own weight, because it has been part of the very problem of all politics to express the human from an erroneous conception of the ethical, totally romanticised and idealised of what we are, of what things are, in short, of what the real itself is.

Since it postulates a formally distant, non-specific, collective, networked, material, animal human with structural components (sexuality, mortality and history) and dynamic components (the Other as a relational component of the configuration of humans), it is possible to understand how all kinds of transformation happen to us. Not only does the
WethOthers aim to explore and describe the structural components of the social human that is permanently articulated by its dynamic components, but it also proposes and creates new political conceptual frameworks, conceived as new forms of democratic legitimation of citizenship. And this can be seen today in the politics of: Chile and Colombia, in different social movements, trade unions, marginalised collectives, LGTBIQA+, nations without states, original peoples, migrants of all kinds that break the borders of nation states, groupings of all kinds through social networks, mixtures of mixtures of humans: welcome the perverse, the abject, the precarious, the surplus, the marginalised, the poor of all kinds, the losers, the queers, the mestizos, the borderers, the weirdos, the freaks, the inhabitants of a country that does not exist, the walkers and their shadow, those who make the path by walking Machado’s way, the monsters who do not let themselves be represented, those who transit, Brecht’s indispensable, the betrayed, the imprisoned, the psychiatrised, the free spirits like Nietzsche, the radical materialists like Freud, those who do not ask but do, those who defy the established, those who in these times of capitalism love, the dancers, those who laugh, eat and drink, those who have been cursed, those who dream, the weak, the fragmented, those who have been tortured, those who have been humiliated, those who have had their bones broken, those who write with inks of blood and laughter, the polignanesi, the children of Sade.

Conclusion

Revolutionary animals perverting all the limits of the instituted in the very contingency of the real

It is neither a matter of substratum nor of correlation, every substratum is „founded“ on a correlation (in this, speculative realism is right), but contrary to what Meillassoux thinks, this correlation is „given“ in the real as difference (as Heidegger saw it, hand in hand with Nietzsche; and, in particular, Derrida among many other 20th century authors); and, furthermore, difference „happens“ from the very distance that perforates us as free human animals who live in the midst of a meaningless, precarious materiality and in the very contingency of our doing with Others.

The real is not in the double game that Meillassoux wants to point out to us in his After Finitude (2006). It is not a question of substance and correlate, two modes that articulate the real and the human in the course of history (obviously past Kant as read by Badiou) and of a rather infantilised and idealised history (between science and philosophy) by means of what expresses this „in itself“ or absolute or real. Least of all is the fact that we must today overcome the horizon of the correlate in all its manifestations in order to think a real in contingency: „Before the transcendental, one of the questions that could decisively break the deadlock between two rival philosophers was the following: which one thinks the true substance: is it the philosopher who thinks the Idea, the
individual, the atom, God, what God? After Kant, and since Kant, to break the tie between two rival philosophers is no longer a question of which one thinks the true substantiality but of which one thinks the most original correlation: is it the thinker of the subject-object correlation, of the noetic-noematic correlation, of the language-reference correlation? The question is no longer: what is the just substratum? But what is the right correlate? (...) But our purpose was not to deal here with the resolution itself. It was not a question, for us, of trying to convince that it was not only possible to rediscover the absolute scope of thought, but that this was urgent, because of the abyssal divorce between the Copernicanism of science and the Ptolemaism of philosophy, whatever the negations on which this schizophrenia rests... It remains to hope that the problem of ancestrality will awaken us from our correlational dream and engage us to reconcile thought and absolute"26. Just as Kubrick tells us the history of humanity with the most famous ellipsis in the history of cinema in his 2001: A Space Odyssey (and he does so in order not to waste time with a story already known and rather boring for everyone): from hominisation, to the deadly club, to the space flight to the Moon in order to understand what happens in the call of the Monolith to the human, I have tried to do the same with this thought by Meillassoux. Basically a very boring book because it tells us the obvious that we already know from a certain idealised history of ideas, as I said; in that Kubrick is more astute, he goes to the end, while Meillassoux stays right at the human's journey to the dark side of the Moon and there, in that place, he apparently stays and doesn't move forward. It is not a question of substratum and correlate and of getting out of the correlate to the real in another way (Hegel already solved that, but not Badiou's Hegel in his book), as contingency; in that the French philosopher is trapped and lost in Ariadne’s Labyrinth. One has to take the step, as an attempt in this writing of the political, of understanding the real from this way of understanding the human in its very contingency that happens to it in its political life in the real (and in this Nietzsche is the master to follow), although for some philosophers this is anti-philosophy (that which is called 'anti' is, perhaps, the only philosophical way of expressing the real as distance in the very contingency of what happens to us), because it is the way out of the Labyrinth, for it is a precarious contingency that constitutes us biographically from the material itself, which always perforates us at a distance and which is actualised in a constitutive movement, with all the material history that it lies (with all its error within itself, Machiavelli is another master in this), in a somatic here with the Other, therefore no longer substrate, no longer correlate, no longer exit from the correlate, but in the distance of the real, a life that revolutionises the established. And which expresses itself in the „scriptural“ mode of philosophy.

26 Meillassoux 2021, pp. 30, 204.
We are strictly animals of revolutions (even if this statement annoys all kinds of conservatives), because beforehand in our distance from all things we are physically and materially open to realise our desire in some way, even if it is totally precarious and contingent; and this itself is the pain of being a human animal (for we are always bleeding, our animality festering) and also shows all that permanent conflict implies in the midst of a meaningless materiality where even capitalism functions in a naturalised way. And that is why Machiavelli is not lost, like some current theorists of social democracy (and obviously of all forms of conservatives, not to speak of the right, because sometimes the term no longer says anything), and Machiavelli tells us categorically: „... the people... even if they are ignorant, they are capable of truth“\(^27\).

And this is possible because we are an Other as Other, we are inexorably a WethOthers; we are at a distance from ourselves and that is a life in its everydayness and present. The best structural-constitutive definition of man is to be a We-Us; and the best dynamic-operative definition is to be Revolutionary; it is impossible to be a human animal that is not revolutionising the system that constitutes it (perverts it); for it would not be human. And here lies the very possibility of dissolution of capitalism, that is, in our human way of being viable in the world by being physically and materially open from our body, our feeling to humans, to things: this constitutive distance is what allows us to be free and in this the constituent power is activated and, at times, the very violence of change becomes inevitable. Hegel himself is emphatic in telling us that it is a right „... the right of rebellion against the order that denies all realisation to the will of free persons“\(^28\).

If Nietzsche, in the 19th century, was at war against Christianity because it had depowered the human and locked it in „Ariadne’s Labyrinth“ (that is, Modernity, with its heavy self); in my case I am at war against capitalism, in the 21st century, because it has sickened us in such a way that today "We hate the Other in its very difference"; and that is why this WethOthers intends that you, my reader, can awaken and dissolve the Other in its very difference, my reader, may wake up and dissolve this Labyrinth in which you have lived; and assume, with all the pain of knowing yourself to be finite, in this simple life, because there is no other life than the one we have and that life happens in and through the Other that constitutes us in the very distance of the real. This WethOthers, in short, speaks to us of how it is possible today for us to love one another. And we love one another "in the same boat" of our bodies tattooed through our socio-history and which opens us up to a possible emancipation that revolutionises everything; and so we pervert

\(^{27}\) Machiavelli 2018, p. 322.

what we have been told about each other, because everyone is from an Other that happens to us sexually and, in particular, when we make love to one another to give of ourselves Centaurs, although this is painful, it is how we continue to be what we are always at the height of the times.

And as Anzaldúa says, many years ago already (1987), that WethOthers, in distance, is expressed in a different, Nietzschean way of writing, to indicate our emancipatory character from all limits in the limits themselves: „Borders are designed to define the places that are safe and those that are not, to distinguish the us (us) from them (them). A border is a dividing line, a thin stripe along a steep edge. A borderland is a vague, undefined place created by the emotional residue of an unnatural boundary. It is in a constant state of transition. Its inhabitants are the forbidden and the banned. There live the crossed: the cross-eyed, the perverse, the queer, the problematic, the street pimps, the mulatto, the mixed race, the half-dead; in short, those who cross, who pass over or cross the confines of „normal“29.

And what Anzaldúa tells us is our philosophy of the real and for a policy of mixtures for these times. And its mode of expression is a „Nietzschean“ philosophy, that is, in simple terms articulated with the „literary“ (in the broad sense), that is, the human, the differential, the psychoanalytic, the feminine, the aesthetic, the social, what perverts us and makes us break the limits of an abstract and patriarchal real fallen from the „heaven of the philosophers“; and that it is that distance that happens to us in the very contingent and breaks us, displaces our limits. It is not an antiphilosophy, as Badiou thinks, but on the contrary, it is the philosophy par excellence to express that real at a distance that perforates us and constitutes our radical contingency (what Hegel calls Rhodes or Dance, the „here“ in Grundlinien: that town of Machiavelli’s Discorsi).

---

29 Anzaldúa 2016, p. 42.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Anzaldúa, Gloria 1987, Borderlands | La Frontera, San Francisco: Aunt Lule Books

--------- 2016, Borderlands | La Frontera, Capitán Swing Libros,

Appleton Timothy 2022, La política que viene. Hacia un populismo de las singularidades,

Barcelona: Ned


Butler, Judith, 2007, Preface to El género en disputa. Y el feminismo y la subversión de la

identidad, Barcelona: Paidós (1999)


Espinoza, Ricardo 2016, Hegel y las nuevas lógicas del mundo y del Estado, Madrid: Akal

--------- 2022, NosOtr0. Manuale per la dissoluzione del capitalismo, Mimesis, Milano (new

edition)

Gramsci, Antonio 2014, Quaderni del carcere. Volumen secondo. Quaderni 6 – 11 (1930-1933),

Torino: Einaudi

Grimal, Pierre 1989, Diccionario de Mitología Griega y Romana, Barcelona: Paidós

Gómez Villar, Antonio 2022, Los olvidados: ficción de un proletariado reaccionario, Barcelona: Bellaterra

Hegel, G. W. F., 1966, Fenomenología del espíritu, Ciudad de México: FCE

---------, 1972, La constitución de Alemania, Madrid: Aguilar


Dieter Henrich


l’edizione di Mario Martelli (1971), Milano-Firenze: Bompiani

Malabou, Catherine 2021, El placer borrado. Clitoris y pensamiento, Adrougé, La Cebra;

Santiago, Palindria

Meillassoux, Quentin 2021, Después de la finitud. Ensayo sobre la necesidad de la contingencia,

Buenos Aires: Caja Negra

Negri, Antonio 2015, El poder constituyente. Ensayo sobre alternativas a la modernidad, Madrid:

Traficantes de Sueños


Madurez I, Madrid: Tecnos


London

Zubiri, Xavier 1980, Inteligencia sentiente, Madrid: Alianza

Zupančič, Alenka 2019, Interview with Alenka Zupančič: Philosophy or Psychoanalysis? Yes,

Please!, Ruda, F., Hamza, A., Crisis & Critique, Vol. 6, Nº 1