

# Anatomy of the Human: Fanon and Žižek

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**Abstract:** On the first page of *Black Skin, White Masks*, Frantz Fanon claims that his book aims for a “New Humanism,” but on the next page he also notes that the Black subject is *not* a human being, that the racialized subject of Western modernity dwells in or rather is relegated to what he famously describes as the “zone of nonbeing.” In this article, I want to argue that Fanon’s vision of a new humanism involves a radical dislocation and a libidinal rewriting of the category of the human itself. A posthuman Fanon, if there is such a thing, emerges through a critical undoing of the ontological divide between the human and the not-quite-human/nonhuman. The question of a posthuman Fanon returns us to the zone of nonbeing, to what Slavoj Žižek would describe as an ontologically destructive zone where the “inhuman core of being-human” is both disclosed and produced, but also holds the promise for more. Not unlike Fanon, Žižek is invested in a philosophy that reckons with the subject, with the subject’s monstrous core, the human after its degentrification, its exposure to the Real, after its banishment into to the hellish zone of nonbeing. This article pursues the politics that emerge from Fanon’s and Žižek’s scrutiny of the human and humanism. Fanon and Žižek come to their similar assessment from two radically different positions. And yet the different steps they take tell us something important about how to combat a humanism that continues to function as an oppressive paradigm, fostering a “cruel optimism” for those wretched beings—Blacks, Palestinians, among numerous others—who think a recognition of their humanity can rescue them from danger and annihilation.

**Keywords:** human, posthuman, inhuman, humanism, posthumanism, Fanon, Žižek, Palestine, Gaza, genocide, zone of nonbeing; Afropessimism

On the first page of *Black Skin, White Masks*, Frantz Fanon claims that his book aims for a “New Humanism,” but on the next page he also notes that the Black subject is *not* a human being, that the racialized subject of Western modernity dwells in or rather is relegated to what he famously describes as the “zone of nonbeing.” In this article, I want to argue that Fanon’s vision of a new humanism involves a radical dislocation and a libidinal rewriting of the category of the human itself. A new humanism must grapple with the racial matrix of the human. This new humanism questions a European humanism that posits the bourgeois, white, male subject as the measure of all things. Or to put it slightly differently, Fanon’s new humanism—this humanism *à venir*—radically breaks with a humanist tradition that both disavows the role of race in imagining the human and makes racialized others constitutive of its definition of the *white* human. A posthuman Fanon, if there is such a thing, emerges through a critical undoing of the ontological divide between the human and the not-quite-human/nonhuman. The question of a posthuman Fanon returns us to the

zone of nonbeing, to what Slavoj Žižek would describe as an ontologically destructive zone where the “inhuman core of being-human”<sup>1</sup> is both disclosed and produced, but also holds the promise for more. Not unlike Fanon, Žižek is invested in a philosophy that reckons with the subject, a divided subject, with the subject’s monstrous core, the human after its degentrification, its exposure to the Real, after its banishment into to the hellish zone of nonbeing, where a barred subject, a Black being is made to reside. This article pursues the politics that emerge from Fanon’s and Žižek’s scrutiny of the human and humanism. Fanon and Žižek come to their similar assessment from two radically different positions. And yet the different steps they take tell us something important about how to combat a humanism that continues to function as an oppressive paradigm, fostering a “cruel optimism”<sup>2</sup> for those wretched beings—Blacks, Palestinians, among numerous others—who think a recognition of their humanity can rescue them from danger and annihilation. Humanism and humanity operate as if they were interchangeable. A recognition of the other’s humanity becomes the precondition for a civil relation, an end to hostility. We are the same. We can remember one of the signs by Black Lives Matter (BML) activists stating in plain language, “We are human too.”

### Humanism and Its Liberal Politics

Humanism promotes the human, and by extension human rights. If dehumanization is the problem, humanization is the cure. Humanization purports to return you to humanity, to your given status as human. Fanon and Žižek are not completely hostile to defending the ostracized and demonized by recognizing their humanity when this means their complexity, which in turn means that their being cannot be abstracted or reduced to their countries’ actions. Žižek signed his name, for example, to a letter calling for restraint and vigilance in the ways we talk about others/enemies in the context of Israel’s genocidal retaliation to Hamas’s attack. The signatories describe themselves as “proponents of human rights,” as belonging to the “Pro-Human Camp.”<sup>3</sup> They reasonably state: “The dehumanization of Israelis and Jews, as well as Palestinians and Muslims, is unacceptable. A person is not merely a representation of a collective identity, history, events, or political orientation. A consistent humanistic approach must address all these unacceptable developments.” Fanon equally has no patience with abstraction, be it to demonize or idealize others: “We shall show no pity for the former colonial governors or missionaries. In our view, an individual who loves Blacks is as ‘sick’ as someone who abhors them. Conversely, the black man who strives to whiten his race is as wretched as the one who preaches hatred of the white man. The black man is no more inherently amiable than the Czech; the truth is that we must unleash the man [*lâcher l’homme*].”<sup>4</sup> “Unleash the human” is arguably Fanon’s *cri de guerre*. Žižek puts his own

universalist spin on the feminist slogan, “Women rights are human rights”: “The greatness of modern feminism [is] not just we women want more. It’s we women want to redefine the very universality of what it means to be human. This is for me this modern notion of political struggle.”<sup>5</sup> At the end of *The Wretched of the Earth*, Fanon evokes the idea of a “new human.”<sup>6</sup> And yet both Fanon and Žižek reject identitarian projects, which tame or disavow the most unsettling aspects of being-human, in favor of universalist projects that harness the paradoxes of nonbeing in being, of an inhuman constitutive of the human, *what is in the human more than human*. Some of Fanon’s readers may object that I’m focusing too much on the zone of nonbeing, neglecting his humanism, which lies in the ways we ought to treat each other. In Fanon’s words: “I find myself one day in the world, and I acknowledge one right for myself: the right to demand human behavior from the other [*exiger de l’autre un comportement humain*].”<sup>7</sup> The right to be treated humanly by the other is Fanon’s assertion and defense of his humanity, his insistence that he is not to be instrumentalized, abstracted as an object, or reduced to the function of a tool. Or in Kantian terms, treat me as an end and not merely as a means. A “consistent humanistic approach” is precisely to treat every human as a human being. The scandal of course is that we don’t. The letter from the Pro-Human Camp calls on us to do so, but there is a tinge of bothsidesism in the letter. It is as if both sides are demonizing the other in the same way, as if the humanity of Israelis and the humanity of Palestinians are equally in danger. To put it bluntly, the letter removes the Western racial matrix from the equation, ignoring that Palestinians begin from a place of exclusion and negation, that they are always already subjugated to a colonial gaze that not only silences them but casts and frames them as dangerous, violent, and deceitful (they claim that they’re anti-Zionists but, in reality, they’re anti-Semitic).

Anti-Semitism has wreaked havoc on the Jewish people from its beginnings to contemporary times. The racialization of the Jews reached its most severe form and expression in Auschwitz—the creation of Israel was, in large part, a measure to assuage Western guilt. Israeli Jews became white once the Western world accepted Israel’s geopolitical position and its self-description as the “villa in the jungle.”<sup>8</sup> A Zionist Israel spoke the racist language of European colonialism, mirroring a familiar image to the West. The redemptive force of Israel’s birth (Jews got their humanity back after it was brutally suspended by the Third Reich) covered over Israel’s settler-colonial DNA. “Exterminate the brutes,”<sup>9</sup> the colonizer’s racist imperative to dispossess and quash unruly Natives (that is, any Native who refuses to surrender or disappear), is as operative in Israel’s genocidal campaign in Gaza as it was in Israel’s founding in 1948 and even in the Zionist colonization of Palestine in the late nineteenth century.<sup>10</sup> In this light, I ask, Can the Pro-Human Camp truly accommodate Palestinian being without wrestling with the West’s oppressive racial matrix of the human?

Under a humanistic horizon, the currency of the human is quite high; to be human is to have one's life constitutively matter. But this humanity has been systematically denied to the wretched, or the blackened beings of modernity—whence the cry “Black Lives Matter.” Its counter, “All Lives Matters,” rings hollow. Why? Its humanistic credential lacks credibility. In principle, all lives do in fact matter, but the problem is that all things are precisely not equal; the historical configuration of power regimes impacts the allocation of value, which some possess, and others don't.<sup>11</sup> Racism is at the heart of the imbalance of justice. The chant names a structural problem, or rather an *ontological* problem that inhibits Black humanity from being acknowledged. We're seeing a similar struggle at play in the genocidal Gaza war. Talks of Palestinian humanity disconcert a large swath of Zionists and pro-Israel supporters. With humanity comes rights. Adi Callai's observation hits the mark: “The most radical position comes directly from the simplest question: are Palestinians human beings? If your answer is emphatically yes, unambiguously and without reservations, then you are a lost cause to Zionism. Because if Palestinians are human beings, then their self-defense is legitimate, and the defense of their continued existence is necessary.”<sup>12</sup> Whenever self-defense is evoked when talking about Palestine/Israel it is always Israel's self-defense that is touted as self-evident.<sup>13</sup> For the West, Israeli humanity is indubitable while Palestinian humanity lingers as a problem. But what kind of problem are the Palestinians?<sup>14</sup> Recognition of Palestinian humanity/suffering does not necessarily open to supporting their self-defense, their anti-colonial resistance, that is, their armed struggle. Humanitarian reason, compounded by the liberal fetish of non-violence, blocks and crowds out anti-colonial reason. The liberal subject can have his cake and eat too—he can be “woke” but not threatening to the established order of things. The liberal big Other tolerates his expression as long as it does not make people uncomfortable (and of course it is the pro-Israel crowd who gets to decide the boundaries of the comfortable, to declare pro-Palestinian supporters anti-Semitic). The liberal subject can “support” Palestinians (believing that Palestinian children shouldn't be starved or bombed) while leaving settler realities and their ontological partitions of Palestine/Israel unquestioned.

At one level, this is not a negligible gain, for to consider Palestinians as victims is better than invisibilizing them through indifference or epistemic violence, of the kind effortlessly generated by a post-9/11 Orientalist vision of their being as religiously fundamentalist, irrational, violent, and intrinsically anti-Semitic. If indifference translates as an affective divestment from Palestinian being/humanity, willful misrepresentation condemns Palestinians to social death, to the zone of nonbeing. Zionist discourse about Palestinians is a racist one. And here, following Toni Morrison, we should give that racist discourse its full ontological impact:

Oppressive language does more than represent violence; it is violence; does more than represent the limits of knowledge; it limits knowledge. Whether it is obscuring state language or the faux-language of mindless media; whether it is the proud but calcified language of the academy or the commodity driven language of science; whether it is the malign language of law-without-ethics, or language designed for the estrangement of minorities, hiding its racist plunder in its literary cheek—it must be rejected, altered and exposed. It is the language that drinks blood, laps vulnerabilities, tucks its fascist boots under crinolines of respectability and patriotism as it moves relentlessly toward the bottom line and the bottomed-out mind. Sexist language, racist language, theistic language—all are typical of the policing languages of mastery, and cannot, do not permit new knowledge or encourage the mutual exchange of ideas.<sup>15</sup>

Morrison's description of oppressive language closely resembles the operations of Zionist discourse. Its objective to actively hinder knowledge of Palestinians (they don't exist, and if they do exist, they're terrorists) stems from an expansionist and eliminationist logic. Since October 7<sup>th</sup>, after Hamas's attack in Southern Israel, a clear "philosemitic McCarthyism,"<sup>16</sup> underwritten by a Zionist hermeneutic, is enjoying policing activists, students, faculty or any conscientious person (many of them Jews) invested in justice and a desire to understand the plight of the Palestinian people. Zionist discourse, along with the amplification of its message via Western media outlets, has unconscionably generated a consent for genocide, enabled by the systematic dehumanization and animalization of Palestinians. "We are fighting against human animals and will act accordingly," war criminal and former Israeli defense minister Yoav Gallant infamously said.<sup>17</sup> In case you're tempted to say that Gallant was talking only about Hamas fighters, consider that nearly 70% of the dead in Gaza are women and children.<sup>18</sup> Israel's war is not a war against Hamas, but primarily a war against the Palestinian people, because for Zionists there is really no difference between the two—they're all terrorists by virtue of their failure to cede their homeland, submit to Zionist reason, and accept their own displacement. The criminality of Zionist discourse is of course matched by Israel's military brutality, its sadistic hunger for collective punishment.

Acknowledging Palestinian victimhood is anathema to Zionist discourse. Victimhood names a suffering of Palestinian humanity. The liberal center of course tries to differentiate its position from that of Ziofascists<sup>19</sup> like Israeli cabinet members Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich who celebrate Palestinian destruction and call for more annexation of Palestinian land (and the goal of prime minister Netanyahu and company has always been to extend the boundaries of Greater Israel). Liberals worry about an empathy deficit when it comes to Palestinians.

They are open to empathizing with the marginalized. They support BLM and the teaching of anti-racism in K-12 public schools, and they worry about the rise of anti-Semitism, so they are careful to cast their support of Palestinians only along the lines of humanitarian needs. Palestinian babies should not die from hypothermia<sup>20</sup>, but Hamas must be condemned, cannot be defended; the more “radical” will also say that Netanyahu must go. But if Liberals may consider Palestinians as victims, they are also quick to point the finger at Palestinians (Hamas) for the misery of Gazans. For the more “radical” liberals, who want to separate themselves from the abysmal Biden-Harris administration, both Palestinian and Israeli leadership are to blame—a *curse on both your houses* type of reasoning. Indeed, they are proud of their nuanced and measured reasoning. However, the liberal position, in whatever shade you prefer, disappoints. Recognition of Palestinian being becomes contingent on the likelihood of liberal empathy. This human emotion remains a double-edged sword for Palestinians and their supporters. On the one hand, empathetic Liberals acknowledge Palestinian suffering. The call for empathy—Palestinians saying, “We are human too”—has clearly made headway in public opinion (despite an aggressive anti-Palestinian corporate media); on the other hand, empathy feeds a cruel optimism. Empathy is not and will never be a politics. I believe that it has reached its plateau. People across the world did march in protest of Israel’s Gaza genocide, and many of them were moved by empathy. Still, we cannot forget that empathy by itself doesn’t open to a confrontation with Israel’s settler-colonial apartheid. It acquiesces too quickly to the demands of humanitarian reason. Worse, it depoliticizes the struggle of the Palestinians, failing to grasp the racial antagonism at the heart of Israel’s genocidal enterprise. Being horrified by the suffering of Palestinians at the hands of a vicious Israeli military doesn’t make you, in and of itself, committed to the Palestinian struggle for liberation. And this is what Palestinians need; this is the only thing capable of altering the coordinates of the debate (I should say that this not a far-fetched ask; the West does it effortlessly in its support of Ukrainian resistance to another bullying nuclear power).

The alternative to both Ziofascists and the liberal center lies in liberating Palestinian humanity from the prison-house of both Zionist reason and humanitarian reason so that “the mutual exchange of ideas” can take place, to recall Toni Morrison’s words. So to adapt Freud’s formulation, we ask, *What does a Palestinian want?* Elias Sanbar’s 1982 interview with Gilles Deleuze, pointedly titled “The Indians of Palestine,” is a good place to start. Sanbar, editor of the then new journal *La Revue d’Études Palestiniennes*, expresses the Palestinian dilemma of being determined from without, abstracted by an oppressive Zionist-Western-white gaze that demonizes all forms of Palestinian resistance, and by a debilitating humanitarian gaze that can only detect Palestinian passivity and abjection. The Western script was and continues to be incapable

of translating the plight of Palestinians as a problem of dispossession. Palestinian “humanity” is still only decipherable in the limited and limiting language of refugees. Western powers display a stubborn unwillingness to see Palestinians as “a dispossessed people in need of a political solution.”<sup>21</sup> If Palestinians dare to challenge their interpellation as passive victims, and exercise agential control over their situation as would any human being protecting their land from invaders, they are automatically tagged as terrorists, illegitimate interlocutors, subjected to extrajudicial murder. Against the images of refugees or militarists, Sanbar pushes “the image of the Palestinian combatant”<sup>22</sup> who struggles to gain visibility, and who participates in a political project. As he clarifies, “before we imposed the reality of our presence, we were thought of only as refugees. When our resistance movement made clear that our struggle could not be ignored, we were again reduced to a clichéd image: we were seen as pure and simple militarists. This image was isolated and reproduced ad infinitum. We were perceived as standing for nothing else. It is to rid ourselves of the militarist image in the strict sense, that we prefer this other image of the combatant.”<sup>23</sup> In a psychoanalytic register, George Yancy explains that “the imago of the ‘Dirty Arab’ or the ‘Palestinian terrorist’ is what takes visual precedence over the Arab/Palestinian as human, as possessing dignity and infinite value.”<sup>24</sup> More a projection than a representation, the imago of the menacing Palestinian, or its debilitated counterpart, infiltrates the white collective psyche. The abject Gazan and the Hamas terrorist, images that tirelessly circulate in our contemporary collective unconscious and libidinal economy, continue to constrain, stifle, and distort our knowledge of Palestinians, obscuring their state and struggle for liberation. *What does a Palestinian want?* Calling for and securing a ceasefire are initial steps. But let’s not forget that the liberation of the Palestinian people is the fundamental goal of the resistance. Our long-term struggle is against Israel’s apartheid settler-colonial regime and its powerful imperialist enablers. How many liberals will follow Palestinians toward that end? Who will push back against Israel’s expansionist logic? Who will demand accountability for Israel’s crimes? Not unlike the weaponization of the charge of anti-Semitism, that of terrorism effectively distracts (“Israel cannot negotiate with terrorists” is a familiar refrain; Israeli terrorism—or its management Palestinian bodies—is never uttered in public discourse) and shuts down any critical engagement with the Palestinian question and delegitimizes in advance our defense of the Palestinian cause—turning the cause into a problem to be judged with prejudice.<sup>25</sup>

In the white political imaginary, the two images seemingly exhaust what being Palestinian *is and can be*. For this reason, the countervailing notion of a combatant holds promise for contesting and thinking anew and otherwise the question of Palestinian humanity, or the question of humanity as such, not because Palestinians hold some special place in the order of beings; unlike the Zionist claim to Jewish exceptionality

(“we are not a people like any other people”; we are the Chosen People and so on), Palestinians earnestly present themselves as “a people like any other people.”<sup>26</sup> I want to linger on the universality of the Palestinian observation, and on the ways this humanity is itself ontologically impacted by settler colonialism. In other words, what does “humanity” look like from the standpoint of the inhabitants of the zone of nonbeing, from the perspective of the wretched? What kind of people are the Palestinians? Read through a Fanonian lens, “a people like any other people” could be rewritten as “a wretched people like any other wretched people.” Here a contrast with Emmanuel Levinas might be illustrative. Levinas, too, ties humanity to wretchedness, to the traumatic experience of Jewish enslavement: “The traumatic experience of my slavery in Egypt constitutes my very humanity, a fact that immediately allies me to the workers, the wretched, and the persecuted people of the world.”<sup>27</sup> He also couples Jewish exceptionalism to the evils of the Shoah, registered in his dedication of *Otherwise than Being*, “to the memory of those who were closest among the six million assassinated by the National Socialists, and of the millions on millions of all confessions and all nations, victims of the same hatred of the other man, the same anti-Semitism.”<sup>28</sup> Anti-Semitism emerges as the master-code, covering all hatred and racist violence. In their rarity and singularity, the Jewish people come to stand for pure human vulnerability: they are (rendered) the timeless Victim. No one can match, let alone exceed, the imago of the Jewish victim. Under this Zionist horizon, everyone else is an imperfect copy of the ontologized form of (Jewish) wretchedness, never having fully experienced the uniqueness of their suffering: “we are *not* a wretched people like any other people.” “Never Again” applies exclusively to Jews.

The example of Palestinian wretchedness follows a different logic; it displays what Žižek calls a materialist use of examples, a form of exemplarity that contrasts with an idealist use, which I take Levinas’s Jewish example to illustrate. According to the idealist approach, “examples are always imperfect, they never perfectly render what they are supposed to exemplify, so that we should take care not to take them too literally”; in contrast, “for a materialist,” however, “there is always more in the example than in what it exemplifies: that is, an example always threatens to undermine what it is supposed to exemplify since it gives body to what the exemplified notion itself represses, is unable to cope with.”<sup>29</sup> To return to the relation between humanity, wretchedness, and peoplehood, my reformulation of Sanbar’s observation, “a wretched people like any other wretched people,” can be reread as exerting pressure on the notion of humanity that it is supposedly meant to exemplify (“we are a people like any other people”); in the process of exemplifying wretched peoplehood it exposes humanity to its other, to what humanists repress or disavow, to what the paradigm of the human is unable or unwilling to confront (that the human needs its constitutive

other to exist). There is thus always more in the exemplarity of Palestinian humanity/peoplehood; their wretchedness unsettles our understanding of the positive, self-contained human.

Wretchedness names the state and condition of the historically damned, subjects expelled from the zone of interest, or subjects that simply never belonged to the zone of being. Their affliction transforms their being (human), deforms their relation to themselves, others, and the world; their dignity turns to humiliation, and their aspirations to dead-ends. An ontological abyss separates the wretched from the human. Here a liberal humanist would work to close the gap dividing the wretched from the human: what the wretched of the world need is more empathy, more humanization. But what if the problem wasn't so much with being wretched as with being human? I want to ask, *What does it take to be or become human? What logic or matrix guarantees and produces the human? And, finally, what are the costs of this human-making to racialized beings, deemed not-quite-human or nonhuman?*

### **The Human and Its Vicissitudes**

When Fanon speaks about Blackness and humanity, he is not meditating on what it means to be a Black human, as if he was merely translating existentialism for an anti-racist struggle, forging a Black existentialism to fight against anti-Blackness. We should keep front and center that for Fanon, the Black human is a barred Black human (barred *because* Black). As per the Afropessimist account of Fanon, the emergence of the "Human" can only be secured at the expense of Black people—"the Human Other is Black."<sup>30</sup> Legally or formally speaking, you might be ontically free, but ontologically you remain a slave. Blackness denotes slaveness. This is the insidious logic underwriting the "afterlife of slavery,"<sup>31</sup> which turns anti-Blackness into the naturalized background of everyday human existence. If you're Black and living in an anti-Black world, it means being forced to adopt a quasi-permanent residence in the zone of nonbeing. Anti-Blackness is part and parcel of America's founding violence. The policing of Black bodies—the law's preserving violence in its everydayness—prolongs America's racist core.

The human and the Black are caught up in a non-dialectical logic. For Blacks to live, the Human must die. That is to say, the reign of the white human must come to an end. But the classical posthumanist move of abandoning the human by recentering the presence of non-human actants affecting our lives and the world will not do. Talks of flat ontology obfuscate rather than elucidate the problem of being Black.<sup>32</sup> And in this respect, I share the Afropessimist reticence or suspicion of posthumanism, though I depart from the Afropessimist reading by de-ontologizing and re-historicizing the zone of nonbeing and making it speak more expansively to Fanon's wretched of the earth—to those

on the receiving end of colonial or supremacist violence and erasure. I want to think through the historico-ontological dimensions of the problem of wretchedness by considering Fanon's notion of the zone of nonbeing alongside the colonized figure of the Palestinian. To echo Achille Mbembe, what we're witnessing today in Palestine is the *becoming wretched of the world*.<sup>33</sup> With the Gaza War, we're witnessing a "return" to colonial cruelty, to the ideology of *might makes right*. The racial matrix of the human gives Israel and other Western nations cover: *we're the humans and they are the brutes. And brutes must be exterminated*. With Operation Iron Swords, we're also witnessing an ontological definition and enactment of genocide: the Israeli military is starving, maiming, and massacring Palestinians and driving that collective body into the Fanonian zone of nonbeing. In short, we're dealing with what can be described as Palestinocide.

What facilitates Palestinocide is an ideological logic and narrative that aggressively defaces Palestinians, that removes the face of the Palestinians to clear the path for a full necropolitics. A Levinasian-inspired humanism here would plead for an undoing of the racist relation of comprehension, and a return to the face to the Palestinians (something that Levinas himself avoided in his infamous interview after the 1982 Sabra and Shatila massacres in West Beirut, Lebanon). Philosophically speaking, the face is what is proper to the human. But for the wretched, facelessness is constitutive of their being. In this vertical partition, they are effectively inferior to the Human. We can map the wretched on the human/nonhuman, or the human/posthuman, divide. One thing is clear. The wretched are cast outside the humanist order of things. They are historical creatures, and yet the wretched's relation to the zone of nonbeing is marked by a quasi-permanence, as Fanon noted:

There is a zone of nonbeing, an extraordinarily sterile and arid region, an incline stripped bare of every essential, from which a genuine new departure can emerge. In most cases, the black man cannot take advantage of this descent into a veritable hell.<sup>34</sup>

In principle, the zone of nonbeing is an ontological reset; it enables as it disables. The destruction of your social ego liberates you by opening up the possibility of a radical refashioning of the symbolic self. The way down is the way up. To this life-affirming existentialist insight, Fanon adds a substantial caveat. There are systemic social forces—the white/settler gaze, a racist symbolic order—holding the wretched back/down. You are a wretched being if you cannot take advantage of this descent into a veritable hell. That is to say, wretchedness gains ontological rigidity when human consciousness stalls after the dissolution of the ego, when transcendence fails to surge. Social death, the zombification of life, characterizes the condition of the wretched. The wretched are

never treated as humans. Their disposability becomes a predicate of their being. The zone of nonbeing all but guarantees their damnation and condemnation. And it is hard to imagine today a starker image of the unlivable zone of nonbeing than the Gaza Strip. Though this is the first livestreamed genocide, Western leaders have systematically failed to put an end to Israel's far-ranging criminality, have failed to treat Palestinians as fellow humans, as possessing livable and grievable lives.

Within the ideological paradigm of humanism, Palestinians are either treated as nonhumans targeted by the Israeli killing machine for early elimination, or envisaged by a segment of the liberal West as not-quite-humans, degraded humans, colonized victims, in desperate need of humanitarian aid. A more critical reframing of Palestinians and the colonial situation reorients us back to the zone of nonbeing and to the ontological upheavals that it is capable and incapable of producing. For Fanon, a metaphysical architecture divides the (neo)colonial world: "Looking at the immediacies of the colonial context, it is clear that what divides this world is first and foremost what species, what race one belongs to."<sup>35</sup> Zionist settlers are one kind of species who dwell comfortably in the zone of *being* whereas the Indigenous Palestinians are another, banished to the zone of *nonbeing*. Zionism's "fascist ontology,"<sup>36</sup> to borrow Nicole Simek's formulation, sets the stage for Palestinocide. It erects a hierarchical order and segregates the humans from the human animals, those who matter from those who don't. Gabriel Winant underscores the ways in which Zionism translates "grief into power."<sup>37</sup> Under a Zionist horizon of law and order, the Jewish Israelis who died are, according to Winant, "pre-grieved," their meaning overdetermined and weaponized, and whose impact becomes inseparable from the justification of Palestinocide: *mourn our dead and exterminate the brutes*.

Zionism rehumanizes and whitens Jews by dehumanizing and blackening Arabs. It uses the Hamas attack to remind Israeli citizens and the world at large of Jewish vulnerability, instantiating its claim of the timeless and irreproachable Victim, and, obscenely, turns the incessant work of mourning into a righteous genocidal campaign. Against the "human animals" next door, Zionists define themselves as full-fledge humans, the gatekeepers of civilization. The political class agrees with Israel's assessment. In keeping with this distorted and distorting Orientalist/racist narrative, Israel's sympathizers describe the Hamas attack of October 7, not as anti-colonial armed resistance to a brutal occupation, but more metaphysically as a "breach of civilization"<sup>38</sup> (this is how Europeans describe the Holocaust, but not chattel slavery or colonialism) greenlighting, as it were, the colonizers' response: genocide as a form of ethico-ontological repair. Israel's "right to self-defense" (and we should keep in mind that the occupier's right to self-defense is not enshrined international law) means a defense of civilization and by extension a defense of humanity and its grammar.

Not unlike Aimé Césaire, Fanon has no truck with such European humanism: “When I look for man in European lifestyles and technology I see a constant denial of man, an avalanche of murders.”<sup>39</sup> This passage from Fanon echoes Walter Benjamin’s famous observation that “Every document of civilization is also a document of barbarism.”<sup>40</sup> But what is Fanon actually after? Where does his critique lead and leave us? In denouncing the fakeness of humanist ideology is Fanon jettisoning the categories of the human and humanism? Answering in the affirmative is premature at best. At worst, it downplays or overlooks Fanon’s attachment to the image of a “new human,” his desire for “the founding of another humanity,” and his laboring for “the flourishing of man and for the enrichment of humanity”<sup>41</sup>—which is perfectly consistent with a *universalist* humanism. A universalist Fanon strikes me as correct—there is no decolonial retreat into particularity nor any nostalgia for a lost harmonious state prior to the dreadful colonial encounter—but the “human” that will be associated with a universalist humanism to come may have more in common with the uncanny figure of the posthuman than the all-too-familiar human of Western civilization. In Fanon’s hands, the “human” of colonial humanism undergoes radical dislocation. The “humanism” that follows this invention of the new human will be *unrecognizable* because the currency of the human will no longer be supported by the racial matrix of the human.

To get to this new human, the human after its anti-colonial dislocation, we must pass through the zone of nonbeing, the zero point of subjectivity, and reorient ourselves to the inhuman perspective of objects. In the opening page of Fanon’s chapter 5 of *Black Skin, White Masks*, we witness the author’s traumatic encounter with the white gaze Fanon’s first line “‘Sale nègre!’ ou simplement: ‘Tiens, un nègre!’,” which translates as “Dirty Nigger!” Or simply, “Look, a Black!”<sup>42</sup> sets the scene for the traumatic encounter with the white gaze translated and materialized linguistically by the N-word. The racial slur immobilizes Fanon, arresting his status as a subject of desire. He becomes “an object among other objects,” and experiences his ontological degradation as a “suffocating reification” (*objectivité écrasante*).<sup>43</sup> Living in the zone of nonbeing means living the life of an object.

Against the Afropessimists, I argue that this description applies to the occupied Palestinians as well. As objects are disposable without any ramification, Palestinian lives are killable with impunity. The erasure of Palestinian humanity is baked in the settler-colonial logic. But how should we understand the negation of Palestinian humanity? There are two ways to negate the statement “the Palestinian is human.” Drawing on Žižek’s reading of Immanuel Kant’s distinction between negative and infinite judgments, we can say, “the Palestinian is not human” and “the Palestinian is inhuman.” As Žižek insists, the two are not the same:

“He is not human” means simply that he is external to humanity, animal or divine, while “he is inhuman” means something thoroughly different, namely that he is neither human nor not human, but marked by a terrifying excess which, although negating what we understand as “humanity,” is inherent to being human.<sup>44</sup>

The Palestinian is not an animal, but a “human animal,” as Gallant put it. This observation is confusing at multiple levels. Haven’t you read your Darwin lately? Of course, we are human *animals*, to be distinguished from the multiplicity of nonhuman animals. Aside from his speciesist arrogance, Gallant manufactures Palestinian difference as an unsettling hybridity, an inhumanity that must be disclosed in order to be annihilated. The inhuman Palestinian fits well within the Zionist order of things. While the Israeli Jew enjoys all the privileges that come with cultural and ontological superiority, the Palestinian is a shadowy creature: *Don’t be fooled by the humanoid features of the Palestinians, they are not like us*. The figure of the Palestinian is not simply outside humanity’s orbit, awaiting her inclusion among liberals of all shades. Palestinians are an uncanny species. Human rights cannot be in practice fully extended to Palestinians as they can be to nonhuman animals. Legally, Palestinians are of course guaranteed rights by international law. But when the world is witnessing a genocide in plain view and Western political leaders do not put stop to the Palestinocide, it should make you wonder if human rights actually apply to them. International law confers rights to Palestinians, but is unable to protect Palestinians from the murderous thug of the region. Anti-Palestinianness is a problem of ontology. There is no humane treatment of the abominable inhuman. The “terrifying excess” of Palestinians is read by Zionists and pro-Israel supporters as evidence of their hatred and cruelty. Evoking a “Clash of Civilizations” framework does not satisfy the needs of the situation: revengeful genocide. Vilifying Palestinians even further, Zionists frame the conflict as a clash between civilization and barbarism. In this Manichean world, Israeli Jews stand for humanity and goodness; they are “the children of light” caught up in struggle against the evil and inhuman Palestinians—“the children of darkness.”<sup>45</sup> We see here the workings of displacement. Zionists blame Palestinians for their anti-Semitism, fanaticism, and brutal violence—they see only their neighbor’s faults or darkness—while being oblivious to their own disproportionate cruelty. The Occupation and the Gaza Wars serve as a tragic reminder that cruelty or inhumanity is constitutive of the human. To say something is constitutive of one’s being does not mean endorsing that thing—crudely naturalizing it and immunizing oneself in advance from its potential horrors—but it does mean maintaining vigilance over our worst tendencies. Cruel acts cannot be allowed to endlessly repeat themselves: “Both [colonized and colonizer] have to move away from the inhuman voices of their respective ancestors so that a genuine communication can be born.”<sup>46</sup> There is no “new

knowledge” of Palestinians, to evoke Morrison’s words, without forging a genuine communication between the settler and the Native.

### The Neighbor and/as the Inhuman

The posthuman is not to be crudely opposed to being human. Rather, it denotes a shift in perspective, a degentrification of the human. If systematic racism and dispossession work to dissolve the imaginary-symbolic human (a destitution, let’s stress, that is imposed on the wretched), the posthuman indexes the Real; the faceless wretched discloses the *real* human. The real human is a posthuman. Contra Levinas and his aspirations for a pure heterology, Žižek turns to Primo Levi’s figure of the *Muselmann* as an account of the real human, the faceless neighbor beyond recognition and accommodation, “a human being reduced to inhumanity.” The Levinasian face, despite its radical otherness and irreducibility to relations of comprehension, presupposes a minimum amount of gentrification. The *Muselmann* doesn’t. This *Muselmann*, the Muslim man, stands for the most abject of Jews; racialized or doubly racialized or de-Judaized, subalternized even further.

The *Muselmann* is a posthuman creature, born of the camps. Having lost his ontological ties to the imaginary-symbolic world, the *Muselmann*’s being or otherness stands for everything that threatens the grammar of the human, starting with nothingness, the desert of the Real. In this context, empathetic identifications miss their target. The *Muselmann* is *not* someone like us, someone who we can readily understand. To be sure, the humanist response would, again, be to try to restore the humanity of the *Muselmann*, to rehumanize or de-posthumanize him, to undo the violence done to him by the crushing reality of Auschwitz. Fanon and Žižek point us in a different direction, bypassing the cruel optimism that plagues humanist/humanizing projects. There is a posthuman ethics that emerges from the zone of nonbeing, that critically responds to the white cruelty that drives blackened others—Blacks, Palestinians, and *Muselmänner*—into this infernal zone, that responds to the unacknowledged inhumanity of the colonizer, settler, and white supremacist that hollows out and reduces others to their inhuman core. It is an ethics, but a paradoxical ethics, a kind of anti-ethics ethics, stemming from an “anti-humanism,”<sup>47</sup> which, as Žižek puts it, “does not only mean an ethics which no longer denies but fearlessly takes into account the latent monstrosity of being-human, the diabolical dimension which exploded in phenomena usually covered by the concept-name ‘Auschwitz’. . . . This inhuman dimension is...., at the same time, the ultimate bedrock of ethics.”<sup>48</sup> This inhuman dimension of the human is, however, ripe for disavowal. If one can muster enough intellectual courage and acknowledge that Nazism is an immanent possibility for all of us humans—whence the ethical relevance of “Never Again” and its application to Gaza, which is becoming another concept-name as a site where

Ziofascist law-making violence is happening—it is another matter to cast the inhuman core as “the ultimate bedrock of ethics.”

This counter-intuitive claim, I would argue, opens to the posthuman, to a being human which avows its own opacity and monstrosity. Žižek’s twist here is that he brings his understanding of the neighbor to bear on the subject, on “what is in a human being more than human.”<sup>49</sup> The real neighbor does not refer exclusively to the external other; it denotes the uncanny otherness that resides in the subject as well. Seeing yourself as neighbor happens whenever you experience a “gap” between what you are as a determinate being and the inscrutable X in yourself. Your social ego is not-all there is. The inhuman is “absolutely immanent, the very core of subjectivity itself.”<sup>50</sup> The subject as neighbor—as a stranger to itself—can only appear as a paradox and scandal from the standpoint of humanism. It deprives the humanist self of all its historical privileges: such as self-transparency, self-mastery, and autonomy. But we must keep in mind that the inhuman core of the human is generative, as it is annihilative. To paraphrase Jacques Derrida on autoimmunity: Without inhumanity, with absolute humanity, the neighbor, reduced to its imaginary-symbolic character, would only be experienced as an extension of my socially sanctioned humanity.<sup>51</sup> Without the inhuman core of the subject, we would be forever caught in ideology and in humanism’s insidious and totalizing grammar.

Being human in the zone of nonbeing casts humanity in all its nakedness, un-gentrified, devoid of its contingent and phantasmatic features. The inhumanity of the subject unmasks the pretenses of humanity. As Žižek puts it, “‘Humanity’ is a notion at the same level as personality, the ‘inner wealth’ of our soul, etc.—it is ultimately a phenomenal form, a mask, which fills in the void that ‘is’ subject.”<sup>52</sup> What the humanist seeks to excise from being and transfer to nonbeing—Blacks and Palestinians—is in fact constitutive of the human. We might say that cruelty is extimate to the subject. This avowed cruelty demystifies and repoliticizes the human, robs the human of its purported innocence, purity, and most importantly of its scapegoating strategies.

### **Cruelty and the Irreproachable Victim**

I want to dwell on cruelty for a bit, on this concept’s phantasmatic and ideological deployment by Western politicians and corporate media outlets. Cruelty and humanity are irremediably interconnected. This truth is repeatedly repressed in Israel’s self-image, and anything cruel that Israelis may have committed is blamed on Palestinians for corrupting an original Israeli innocence. Witness the self-congratulatory observation attributed to former Israeli prime minister Golda Meir that forgiveness from the Israeli side will be tested, will reach its limits, not because Palestinians have killed too many Israelis but rather when Israel is asked

to forgive the unforgivable, which, in her narcissistic moral vision, means to forgive the Palestinians “for having forced [Israelis] to kill [Arab] sons.”<sup>53</sup> From the self-designated position of moral superiority, Meir muses about what it will take to put an end to the conflict between Israel and its Arab neighbors: “Peace will come when the Arabs love their children more than they hate us.”<sup>54</sup> From the masterful assessment of the situation, the message is clear: Arabs need to reform their savagery and keep in check their innate anti-Semitism. Arabs need to prioritize life over death, love over hate. Israel’s humanity is already here. Palestinians and the rest of the Arabs need to catch up. Weaponizing the card of self-defense evacuates, as Jacqueline Rose points out, “all responsibility for Israeli state violence by lodging it inside the hearts and minds of the enemy (‘You made me do it’),” and it is this, she says, “that I find most chilling.”<sup>55</sup> I agree. By discarding any sense of responsibility and immunizing itself from judgment, Israel can undertake a genocide in plain view with the support of a majority of its nationals. The Gaza genocide is ripe for a similar vexatious interpretation of the Palestinian struggle. More than a year into Israel’s criminal operation in Gaza, Nathan Lopes Cardozo, in an op-ed in *The Jerusalem Post*, recycles the same morally repulsive logic:

One of the great tragedies of the State of Israel is that it must constantly defend itself against ongoing attacks on its citizens. When its enemies claim Israel will be wiped out, “from the river to the sea,” there is no option but to defend itself with all its might. Israeli Jews are forced to rely on military power to survive. But this is a reliance that they abhor. It was Golda Meir who said, “Perhaps we will be able to forgive the Arabs for killing our sons, but it will be harder for us to forgive them for having forced us to kill their sons.” It is this paradox that makes these wars so intolerable. Those who are forced to fight are those who hate it the most.<sup>56</sup>

Being proud of genocide is a new low. Putting an end to Palestinian desires for unity, equality and freedom (what the chant “From the river to the sea, Palestine will be free” means) is a cause for national celebration. This is sadism masquerading as righteousness. All of this stems from Israel’s irreproachable victim complex.<sup>57</sup> Being Palestinian—struggling for one’s liberation—victimized Israel, made Israel less pure, less innocent. Causes and effects are ideologically reversed. Palestinians (not the Occupation, dispossession, ethnic cleansing, or genocide) are responsible for Israeli aggression, for their criminal endeavors. Killing Palestinians is “unnatural” to Israeli humanity, to Israel’s “most moral army.”<sup>58</sup> Oded Na’aman teases out the implications of a military that sees itself as always reacting to violence, as being defensive since time immemorial: “It is not that the Israel Defense Forces is so named because it is only used defensively; rather, for Israelis, every use of the Israel Defense Forces is by definition

a defensive act.”<sup>59</sup> Israel can never occupy the position of the aggressor or victimizer.<sup>60</sup> Israeli hasbara sells the West a simplistic but efficient narrative where Israel is a synecdoche of “humanity” while the Palestinian people are governed by “the law of the jungle.”<sup>61</sup> As Palestinian terror is constitutive of Palestinian being, Jewish innocence is constitutive of Jewish being. Each time we utter the word “IDF” (Israeli Defense Forces) we reinforce this Orwellian designation. The Israeli military force is first and foremost an offensive force, an occupation force. “IOF” is a far more honest description of what Israel does to its Palestinian neighbor, but not only to Palestinians; its mayhem has touched many Arab or Muslim-majority countries. Israel appears willing to say anything to maintain the moral higher ground: *you made me do it* logic casts the victim as the instigator, exculpating, in turn, the true aggressor. A Golda Meir for contemporary times: *Palestinians cannot be forgiven for having forced the IOF to kill their mothers and children.*

Israel is not an exception in its practice and disavowal of cruelty. The West, to which Israel faithfully belongs, has a long history of projecting its own colonial cruelties onto distant others. The Orient is a case in point; the Orient after 9/11 crushingly so. Israel willingly inscribes itself in that Western imperialist tradition. Palestinians are barbarians, an innately terrorist people, new Nazis, pure evil or inhumanity incarnated. When cruelty is the problem of/in others, when the West believes in its unquestioned good, the rest of the world suffers.

Fanon’s politics of the wretched operates under a different horizon. While Fanon announces a new humanism at the beginning of *Black Skin, White Masks*, his writings index the Herculean effort needed for the violent dislocation, psychic divestment in the predominant image, and reinvention of the human. The zone of nonbeing is itself framed around two key observations about the human and its relation to whiteness and Blackness. The first comes right before the zone of nonbeing passage: “Running the risk of angering my black brothers, I shall say that a Black is not a man [*le Noir n’est pas un homme*].”<sup>62</sup> David Marriott and other Afropessimists elevate the “*n’est pas*” of Fanon, disclosing the abyss that separates the Black from the Human.<sup>63</sup> In the racialized zone of nonbeing all there is is Black (as) nothingness. For Black folks, the dissolution of the ego (social death) fails to inaugurate the formation of a new self—humanist or otherwise. Unlike the Sartrean idyllic version, Fanonian nothingness does not translate into the affirmation of freedom and transformative existence.<sup>64</sup> Libidinal and material constraints lock Blacks in their nonbeing. Cast in this light, the experience of the Real is itself a kind of white/human privilege. To experience the Real as something traumatic is already to assume the reality of a gentrified self capable of being unsettled. Fanon further troubles the existentialist ideal of transcendence by formulating the exit from this hellish zone as difficult and rare.

On the Afropessimist account, Black being is not a human but a position of negation, a kind of anti-human, with Blackness giving coherence to the white human. Fanon thus qualifies his new humanism à venir with the crushing actuality of a latent anti-humanism, at least when it comes to the most wretched of beings. If Blackness signifies nothingness, whiteness purports to represent humanity as such. But on the following page, Fanon complicates the relation between whiteness and humanity by disclosing the vicissitudes of fantasy in his uncompromising assessment of Black and white desires: “The black man wants to be white. The white man is desperately trying to achieve the rank of man” [*Le Noir veut être Blanc. Le Blanc s’acharne à réaliser une condition d’homme*].”<sup>65</sup> Black being envies whiteness, but the white self is equally touched or plagued by his phantasm of humanity insofar as he knows that the being of his whiteness does not coincide with humanity. So in a significant way the white self is *not* a man either. Strictly speaking, no one is a “Man.” The human is a fetish, always a fleeting phantasm. In an act of bad faith or willful ignorance, whites claim the “human” as theirs, but this is an ideological lie used to enforce and legitimize the status quo, that is, an ontological partition of the world.

Likewise, when we claim the humanity of Blacks and Palestinians, which is again an irresistible claim, inseparable from the claim that their lives do matter, we risk prolonging this lie. In adopting the humanist framework, we, in effect, suspend or postpone a reckoning with the racial matrix of the human. A posthuman horizon enters the discussion the moment we linger on this double bind; when we step back and ponder the paucity of humanism and the anti-Black and anti-Palestinian world that it underpins. A new humanism, if there will be such a thing, will ironically resonate far less with the humanism of old and far more with the challenges of an emergent inhuman posthumanism.

- 1 Žižek 2022, p. 227.
- 2 Berlant 2011.
- 3 The Pro-Human Camp 2023.
- 4 Fanon 2008, pp. xii–xiii.
- 5 Žižek 1999.
- 6 Fanon 2004, p. 239, translation modified.
- 7 Fanon 2008, p. 204.
- 8 Benn 2013.
- 9 Hirschkind 2023.
- 10 Massad 2000, p. 62. As Rashid Khalidi observes, “the modern history of Palestine can best be understood in these terms: as a colonial war waged against the indigenous population, by a variety of parties [namely British imperialists and Zionists], to force them to relinquish their homeland to another people against their will” (Khalidi 2020, p. 13).
- 11 Goldberg 2015.
- 12 Callai 2024.
- 13 Western media outlets do not dare to point out the inconvenient truth that an occupying force does not have the international right to self-defense. Who has an unquestionable legal right to self-defense are the Palestinian people, though this right is not without conditions; civilians, for instance, cannot be targeted in your resistance to the occupying military force.
- 14 Zalloua 2024.
- 15 Morrison 1993.
- 16 Neiman 2023.
- 17 Sharma 2024.
- 18 Moench 2024.
- 19 Khader 2024.
- 20 Nader 2024.
- 21 Erakat 2019, p. 73.
- 22 Deleuze 2007, pp. 194–95.
- 23 Deleuze 2007, pp. 194–95.
- 24 Davids et al, forthcoming.
- 25 “To invoke the word ‘terrorism,’ within the conventional bounds of liberal discourse, is to bring the debate to a screeching halt—we can argue back and forth as much as we like over the question of whether this or that military operation was carried out in the right manner, adhering to the proper rules and protocols of legitimate warfare, but when terrorism enters the discussion, there can be no equivocation. There is no spectrum of acceptable opinions, no room for reasonable disagreement when it comes to terrorism. There are only two sides—those who are with the terrorists, and those who are against them” (Somayajula 2023).
- 26 Deleuze 2007, p. 199
- 27 Levinas 1990.
- 28 Levinas 1981.
- 29 Žižek 2007, p. 234.
- 30 Wilderson 2020, p. xi.
- 31 Hartman 2007, p. 6.
- 32 Zalloua 2021, pp. 143–85.
- 33 “Now, for the first time in human history, the term ‘Black’ has been generalized. This new fungibility, this solubility, institutionalized as a new norm of existence and expanded to the entire planet, is what I call the *Becoming Black of the world*. . . . The systematic risks experienced specifically by Black slaves during early capitalism have now become the norm for, or at least the lot of, all of subaltern humanity” (Mbembe 2017, p. 6).
- 34 Fanon 2008, p. xii. Philcox’s translation leaves out a crucial comma after “an incline stripped bare of every essential.” See Maher 2022, p. 20.
- 35 Fanon 2004, p. 5.
- 36 Simek 2024, p. 410.
- 37 Winant 2023.
- 38 Berkovits 2024.
- 39 Fanon 2004, p. 236.
- 40 Benjamin 1968, p. 262.
- 41 Fanon 2021, pp. 688, 657.
- 42 Fanon 2008, p. 89.
- 43 Fanon 2008, p. 89.
- 44 Žižek 2012, p. 166.
- 45 Finn 2023.

46 Fanon 2008, p. 206.

47 Žižek 2008, p. 166.

48 Žižek 2008, p. 166.

49 Žižek 2022, p. 228.

50 Žižek 2013, p. 160.

51 “Autoimmunity is not an absolute ill or evil. It enables an exposure to the other, to *what* and to *who* comes—which means that it must remain incalculable. Without autoimmunity, with absolute immunity, nothing would ever happen or arrive; we would no longer wait, await, or expect, no longer expect one another, or expect any event” (Derrida 2005, p. 152).

52 Žižek 2022, p. 227.

53 “We will perhaps in time be able to forgive the Arabs for killing our sons, but it will be harder for us to forgive them for having forced us to kill their sons” (qtd. in Na’aman 2016).

54 Qtd. in Na’aman 2016.

55 Rose 2023.

56 Cardozo 2024.

57 Zalloua and Nir 2024.

58 Turfah 2024.

59 Na’aman 2016.

60 The logic of self-defense also applies to the illegal settlements—“victory through settlement” posits settlers not as invaders on Palestinian land but as protectors of Israel. See Reiff 2023.

61 Finn 2023.

62 Fanon 2008, p. xii.

63 Marriott 2020.

64 Warren 2018, p. 183n.33.

65 Fanon 2008, p. xiii.

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