

The New Right Machinery

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Abstract: The aim of this article is to provide an answer to the question about the New Right by applying the “mythological machine” model developed by the Italian mythologist and Germanist Furio Jesi. According to Jesi, the production of stereotypes, conspiracy theories, or the exploitation of mythical-religious images for political purposes are typical of the machine’s activity. Consistent with this activity is, evidently, the production of the resentful petty-bourgeois mass and – according to our hypothesis – the maintenance of its original “paradox”: it is a mass that feels oppressed by the same apparatus that maintains it as such by fabricating and organizing its resentful sense of oppression. From the point of view of the New Right, this vicious circle obviously turns to a virtuous one; for us, instead, truly debunking this trick means destroying the conditions that make it effective and productive.

Keywords: New Right, Mythological machine, Mass, People, Walter Benjamin, Furio Jesi.

1.

If we do not believe or are not interested in believing in a technical self-definition, can we really believe in the existence of a “New Right”? Is this adjective “new” referable to the wing that at any cost, using any means, has always worked for the preservation of the conditions of domination and exploitation? Whatever the answer, the risk is to fall into the habit (an old vice, in truth) of always looking for “new” phenomena to understand, that is, of believing in the myth of novelty (the positive term) which necessarily replaces everything that has been written and passed down (the negative term, the not-new). This myth is based on the linearity of progress, and therefore on the presumption that the old phenomenon is the one already understood, while the new one is the unusual one that we need to understand. In other words, we should understand a change, a novelty whose conditions, however, we assume are already known. Such a conception of novelty is evidently paradoxical, but its *raison d’être* is the same force of habit that hides this evidence. In fact, the very idea that there is always something new is nothing else than the claim that events always follow the same order, that is, the claim to introduce the usual into the unusual, the stable into the unstable: it is always the same, old idea of an always identical renewal impulse. As far as our problem is concerned, this idea is the other side of the conception of fascism as an “eternal phenomenon”, a definition perhaps not incongruous but to be used with the utmost caution, since it is precisely fascism (whether “old” or “new”) which defines its concepts with the particle *Ur-*.

In the 1970s, when Italian fascism (whose continuity was represented in parliament by the Italian Social Movement) imposed itself on the political scene as a new one, or neo-fascism, the mythologist

Furio Jesi described in his book *Cultura di destra (Right-wing Culture)* “the most characteristic and widespread element of right-wing culture” as a “truly cadaverous immobility that pretends to be a perennial living force”. Quoting Oswald Spengler’s expression “ideas without words”, Jesi described right-wing ideology as a “linguistic or mythological machine” that works by spreading a dense network of clichés, stereotypes, commonplaces, formulas which seem clear precisely because they don’t need to be understood. In this way, every word is here reduced to a simple intermediary of what is before all words, as if every word alludes to something that must not be said, a secret that has always been shared by the subjects, and therefore defines them as belonging to a specific group.

The mythological machine always *alludes* to a myth, to something that dates back to the most remote past (identity, homeland, origin, Blood and soil). In other words, it offers tales of the myth (mythologies) which refer to the myth and at the same time hide it. The machine gives us the mythologies of which its surface is made, and at the same time alludes to the unverifiable presence of myth within it. In some ways, this linguistic and cognitive model recalls Foucault’s famous description of the disciplinary dispositif of the Panopticon, in which the unverifiable presence of the guardian at the center of the tower ensures that the prisoners always feel controlled. Likewise, for the functioning of the mythological machine it is not essential that the existence of its content be certain: it is instead required that this existence be simply possible, that is, unverifiable. And if in Bentham’s model the coercive condition strictly excludes the possibility of not believing in the presence of the guardian at all, in the case of the machine, i.e. in the absence of coercion, believing or not believing in the existence of the myth is not really an alternative. The full efficiency of the machine corresponds to its absolute indifference towards the dichotomies true/false, belief/unbelief. What it claims to contain must instead be simply credible, not absolutely true but possibly truthful or plausible. Regarding anti-Semitic racism, for example: those who believe in the Protocols of the Elders of Zion care little about their authenticity. The conspiracy does not have to be a proven fact, but simply a possibility. The machine therefore does not operate on the level of political lying and political action which requires lies: it works on the level of rumour, which, so to speak, acts on actions and influences them. And if “the point beyond which lying becomes counterproductive” always arrives, if “the attempt to get rid of facts”¹ is ultimately fallacious, the mythological machine does not run these risks.

Right-wing culture is therefore conspiracy culture by definition. In Jesi’s terms, it is the culture or language made of ideas without words and that is of allusive words, with a capital letter: Nation, Family... but also: Freedom, Revolution². As Jesi explains, “Most of the cultural heritage, even of those who today do not want to be right-wing at all, are right-wing cultural residues [...] It is useless and unreasonable to be scandalized by

the presence of these residues, but it is also necessary to try to know where they come from”³. Mythologies can change and renew themselves, but the machine continues to function in its own way. To be more precise (and a bit repetitive), it is precisely the novelty that hides the immobile centre, alludes to the origin, to the very distant or unverifiable past. Moreover, the machine can be compared to the Panopticon because it is the Columbus’s egg in the order of what Karl Kerényi called the “technicalization of myth”. It automatically and maximally efficiently carries out the production and exploitation of mythologies for political purposes. Now, as we know, political mythologies are produced to influence the masses: the functioning of the mythological machine is therefore nothing but the production of the “mass” itself. We could say that the mythological machine produces – or helps to produce – the mass-man, and we could also define it as a device of subjectivation capable of operating on a large scale.

In this sense, right-wing ideology is always old and always new, because mythologies renew themselves and change when necessary, at the positive or negative pole of the tireless device: mythologies of well-being or security, mythologies of free speech, mythologies of unlimited Credit or Debt, mythology of immigrants who are “poisoning the blood of the country”, mythologies of the Great Replacement and the American way of life, mythology of the Christian heterosexual family and Aryan Heritage...

2.

What is a mass, that is, the product and at the same time the acting subject of the mythological machine? In 1936 Walter Benjamin described the masses as petty bourgeoisie whose essence is purely psychological.

the mass as an impenetrable, compact entity, which Le Bon and others have made the subject of their “mass psychology” is that of the petty bourgeoisie. the petty bourgeoisie is not a class; it is in fact only a mass. And the greater the pressure acting on it between the two antagonistic classes of the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, the more compact it becomes. in *this* mass, the emotional element described in mass psychology⁴.

This non-class, this compact mass or mass as such, this “sociological freak of nature”, is the multitude of customers brought together by the capitalist market, whose casual aggregation, marked by mutual antagonisms, is, for the subjects themselves, simply perturbing: “in *this* mass, the emotional element described in mass psychology is indeed a determining factor – whether they give vent to war fever, hatred of Jews, or the instinct for self-preservation”⁵. But this disturbing closeness of individuals who are extraneous to each other can be rationalized by them as “‘fate’ in which the ‘race’ is reunited” (Benjamin), or, we could also say, as identity or identity

of “the people”. The internal disintegrative forces are therefore directed against the foreigner, also perceived as “the hidden enemy among us”.

Returning at this point to Jesi’s model, we could say that the mythological machine works as an instrument capable of producing and directing these forces. Their active origin is the difficult or impossible integration of the single individual into the collective, that is, that feeling of mutual aggressiveness of customers which cannot and must not be appeased but rather exploited and oriented towards a target which the machine is always capable of fabricate. Heading towards this enemy is a mass, a simple multitude, which however calls itself a people, i.e. it is presumed to have a single will. However, and again at the risk of repetition and obviousness, we must be clear: the mass as such is not a natural phenomenon, it is an historically characterized product. It is the mass of individual consumers, isolated, selfish, competing with each other but united in the space of the capitalist market. The mass that rationalizes this condition and recognizes itself as “the people” therefore results from further manipulation. This work of fabrication is carried out and controlled through mythological projections (and a coherent practice of intimidation and persuasion) by the state apparatus: “the people” are in fact nothing other than the subject of state sovereignty.

But on the other hand, a perfect transformation of the mass into a people can never be achieved, since the market always needs customers, and the antagonistic and competitive character of the latter contradicts the unitary character of “the people”. The internal conflict of the multitude (or the mutual competition of individual subjects brought together by the capitalist market), thus corresponds to the continuously unresolved tension between “mass” and “people”. In other words, it is the contradictory tendency of the multitude of individuals who contest as oppressive and illiberal the very apparatus that should constitute them as “the people” i.e. as the organized unit that they claim to become (even as they protest).

3.

The mass – or the crowd – is a split being and, as has been noted many times, it is an ephemeral being (“a ray of light brings it together; a downpour disperses it”, wrote Gabriel Tarde – and Elias Canetti will echo him: “rain is the crowd in the moment of discharge, and stand also for its disintegration”⁶): but *it is split because its ephemerality depends precisely on its claim to be durable*. The capitalist market economy, with its state superstructure, is the historical a priori of its peculiar, unstable or “unsociable sociability”. Therefore we must also recognize here the classic opposition, highlighted by Hobbes, between the people and the multitude (“the multitude against the people”). As we read in *De Cive* (XII, 8),

The people is somewhat that is one, having one will, and to whom one action may be attributed; none of these can properly be said

of a multitude. The people rules in all governments. For even in monarchies the people commands; for the people wills by the will of one man; but the multitude are citizens, that is to say, subjects. In a democracy and aristocracy, the citizens are the multitude, but the court is the people. And in a monarchy, the subjects are the multitude, and (however it seem a paradox) the king is the people. The common sort of men, and others who little consider these truths, do always speak of a great number of men as of the people, that is to say, the city; they say that the city hath rebelled against the king (which is impossible), and that the people will, and nill, what murmuring and discontented subjects would have, or would not have, under pretence of the people stirring up the citizens against the city, that is to say, the multitude against the people⁷.

We have quoted Kant's famous formula above. But now we must also remember the words written by Carl Schmitt precisely about Hobbes' theory and the passage from the multitude (i.e. the state of nature or the war of all against all) to the people (i.e. the civil state): "men who gather in anguished enmity they cannot overcome enmity, the premise of their coming together"⁸. *Furthermore, we cannot forget that the Hobbesian opposition has also been described several times in the jargon of political sociologists. With reference to modern democracy and Le Bon's mass psychology, this was brilliantly done by Theodor Geiger:*

Democracy is not at all the government of many (ochlocracy), but rather the government of all [...] When Le Bon speaks simultaneously of the "power of democracy" and the "power of the masses", he does nothing but confuse demos and plethos (ochlos), democracy and the square. Democracy is particularly unstable in its intellectual structure; an oligarchy cannot develop very well under democratic forms [...], nor can an ochlocracy arise from it without affecting democratic forms. In real democracy, which is extremely rare, there is no ochlos. This only arises where democracy begins to fail due to the leader problem.

In a democracy the whole is the bearer of a planned, organized and legal policy. The politics of the street is a politics of resentment, whose subjects are *oi polloi*, a politics whose essential characteristic is precisely the rejection of legal and constitutional politics.

[...] And the feeling that every bond must become slavery somewhere leads to the denial of the conscious bond, of the legal system in general. All the masses are anarchists. In the spirit of Tönnies, we could say: it is the return to the will of those who despair of the arbitrary order – and the obvious paradox of this will is the sociological tragedy of the masses⁹.

If, as has been observed, the complete transformation of the mass into a people is unattainable, expressions such as “paradox”, “sociological tragedy” describe – in the same logical scheme – an unsolvable stalemate. In fact, we are dealing with two sides of the same coin: *the voice of the people will never be a seditious murmur precisely because the mass will never form a unity, because a multitude of individuals gathered together will never ultimately have a single voice*. Therefore the “people” as an efficient concept of state logic paradoxically exists since the multitude will never be a people. It is therefore perfectly logical and necessary that, from the perspective of capitalism, an attempt to respond to this situation is individualist anarcho-capitalism. The fact that this ideology reacts to the mass’s realization of its tragic paradox is demonstrated by its first whiny statement: “the State is not ‘us’”¹⁰. When the fundamental affirmation of anarchism (“the State is that organization in society which attempts to maintain a monopoly of the use of force and violence in a given territorial area”¹¹) is associated with the clarification according to which “State necessarily lives by the compulsory confiscation of private capital, and [...] is profoundly and inherently anticapitalist”¹² is obviously because neither the State nor anarchy, but Capital is the true source of this murmur that now tries to make its own weakness a strength, its problematic dispersion in discordant individual voices the solution to its problem. Of course, this magic trick can only have some success on the State stage.

On the other hand, to the impossibility of constituting mutually antagonistic subjects into a people, one can only respond – as Schmitt did – by offering the myth of the identity of the people and of the enemy: one could believe that this response is given in good faith, because it is the response from those who cannot help but believe in the people; however, it is the response of the preventive counter-revolution, i.e. of those who, intimidated or not, trust in the force of the state apparatus and must safeguard it at any cost. The two poles, mass and people, are in fact nothing other than the two functional poles (in their more or less latent tension) of the state machinery: firmly maintaining the ability to govern in their sometimes very turbulent field of tension is what we give to the very name of government or “art of government”.

The two historically characterized and collaborating extremes of this continuously oscillating system are: – the prevalence of the demos, organized and legal democracy in Geiger’s sense; – the prevalence of the crowd, the disintegrating madness of the mass which however necessarily takes the form of the state, this once totalitarian. The latter is undeniable evidence, something that had already appeared obvious to Ortega y Gasset:

it rather confounds one to hear Mussolini heralding as an astounding discovery just made in Italy, the formula: “All for the State; nothing outside the State; nothing against the State.” This alone would

suffice to reveal in Fascism a typical movement of mass-men. Mussolini found a State admirably built up – not by him, but precisely by the ideas and the forces he is combating: by liberal democracy. He confines himself to using it ruthlessly [...] Through and by means of the State, an anonymous machine, the masses act for themselves¹³.

This action, truly typical of the masses, certainly does not deny but confirms and brings their “tragedy” to the extreme. Now mythically identified with the people or the state, the masses, believing in this myth, cannot now help but turn against themselves, gripped by the madness of war, in an impetus that is both destructive and self-destructive.

4.

This quick sketch, it will be said, shows at most some aspects of the ancient twentieth-century phenomenon, but the new right is something very different, just as it is true that capitalism does not remain the same over the centuries.

Let us then look at the present circumstances. It has been repeatedly reported that democratic liberalism is crumbling and that two new forms are emerging in its place: on the one hand, illiberal democracy or identity democracy without rights (e.g. Orbán’s Hungary), on the other anti-democratic global liberalism (radical European or American neoliberalism). As has also been very recently and appropriately observed, this situation does not correspond to a true dichotomy between the two systems but to a “bipolar equilibrium”¹⁴. For our part, we can infer that this balance, dangerously stretched to the extreme limit of conflict, is actually possible within the framework constructed by liberal democracy itself (a background that only the truly dichotomous situation would eliminate from the scene). The bipolar balance, however, maintains it and also exists within the two systems, which then undergo mutual influences, confirming in one sense or another the paradox of the mass: democracy without rights must strengthen its defenses (authoritarian and police) against the pressures of a latent democratic mass; illiberal democracy, for its part, is not internally pacified, nor are the last semblances of liberal democracies (just think of the current neo-Nazi threat in Germany).

Benjamin, the heterodox Marxist, quoted in 1936 the old, reactionary Le Bon. According to the same logic, we could perhaps still remember Ortega y Gasset and his “señorito satisfecho”¹⁵: dissatisfaction is a luxury that the self-satisfied man can afford; it is only the negative mark on the scale of satisfaction, which can even reach (and there is no contradiction in this) the extreme of real poverty. The chronically dissatisfied mass, which murmurs against the State, is always and only the mass-people paradoxically united in mutual disagreement and always directed in a more or less violent and explicit way against the weakest, the last of

the earth, both when it democratically claims “its” civil rights or even the rights of the capitalist individual against the excessive power of the state or, on the opposite pole, when it votes for far-right parties or even unleashes its violence by joining fascist groups. The petty-bourgeois mass of satisfied-dissatisfied customers nourished by “right-wing culture” will never experience a situation of true contradiction. At the same time – this is its paradoxical and even tragic aspect – it must at all costs prevent the true contradiction from maturing. For the multitude of dissatisfied and insecure customers who protest or murmur against the state, the chains could in fact never be radical. And the chains will never be radical as long as the machine alludes to ideas without words by spreading conflicting – but therefore ultimately coherent – mythologies (Homeland, Soil, Tradition, Identity... but also: Democracy, Freedom, Rights, Progress...).

5.

The concepts of class, revolutionary class, class struggle, which Benjamin contrasted with that of the fascist crowd, enjoy very little credit today. But the error is in the gaze, one could reply: the “radical chains” cannot and must not appear in the dominant perspective of the masses, or of the “planetary petty bourgeoisie in which all the old social classes are dissolved”¹⁶.

On the other hand we still have to ask ourselves whether our interpretative framework is useful or completely useless for understanding the “New Right” theme, or rather the novelty as such. This inability could in fact correspond to a conditioning of the mythological machine. The risk, which Jesi himself warned against, is that of taking the model too seriously, and therefore paradoxically being fascinated by it in this way.

Let’s try to return again, from this point of view, to the current circumstances and refer to an example taken from the news of very recent times. In an article published a few weeks ago (in the April issue of “Le monde diplomatique”), the French-Israeli essayist Marius Schattner reflected on the words used by Binyamin Netanyahu after 7 October, and above all on the question of their actual, real novelty. As is known, in fact, “at a press conference in Tel Aviv on 28 October 2023, and in a letter of 3 November to IDF soldiers who praised their ‘fight against the murderers of Hamas’”, the Israeli prime minister quoted the passage from Deuteronomy (25.17): “Remember what Amalek did to you”. The use of this rhetoric evidently corresponds to the claim to affirm the novelty or unprecedented character of the ongoing conflict, giving it “a religious gloss”. But it is precisely against this claim that Schattner re-established the rights of the reality principle. In fact, as he points out, “such language [...] predates the reaction to the Hamas atrocities of 7 October”. The Israeli authorities have used this rhetoric for several years, “albeit less overtly”:

during Operation Cast Lead in 2008–09, the IDF’s chief rabbi Avichai Rontzki urged the soldiers of ‘God’s army’ to show no mercy towards the enemy, invoking the wars of conquest in Canaan, the Promised Land. And in 2014, during Operation Protective Edge in Gaza, General Ofer Winter [...] wrote in an official dispatch, ‘History has chosen us to spearhead the fighting against the terrorist Gazan enemy which abuses, blasphemes and curses the God of Israel’s [defence] forces’. At the time, such statements from a high-ranking military officer caused a scandal and cut short his military career¹⁷.

It therefore seems that the “novelty” consists in this: to unfold in the most blatant way, political-religious rhetoric must find its opportune moment. This moment was offered by the unprecedented violence of the October 7 attack, which also has an undeniable mythological character, opposite and corresponding.

On the same newspaper page, Anne Waeles calls into question the historian of Judaism Amnon Raz-Krakotzkin, author of *Exil et souveraineté*. Also recalling Gershom Scholem’s warning about the dangers and ambiguities of modern Hebrew as a national language, Raz-Krakotzkin underlined that the ideology of the far-right settlers (represented today by the ultranationalist religious wing of the Israeli government) is consistent with a long-term political attitude, i.e. with the exploitation of Judaism implemented by Zionism for the purposes of its secular messianism. The settlers’ approach – he wrote – “is no different from that of the secular Zionists; they simply took it to its logical conclusion”¹⁸.

6.

At this point, to outline a conclusion, let’s go back to considering the “mythological machine” model once again, and let’s try to shift our gaze from today’s news to yesterday’s.

In a 1968 article, titled *The Arabs and Israel: Political and spiritual Zionism*, Jesi opposed his reluctance to spiritual Zionism’s reliance on the state as the means or path to the spiritual goal of Zion. He expressed the doubt that that path towards the spiritual goal of perfection could instead stop precisely in the State of Israel, which like all States was then and will always be fatally involved in a complex game of political interests. Beyond this, Jesi also harshly criticized political Zionism which, being foreign to religion, drew propaganda elements from it: he expressed his

repugnance towards any political exploitation of myths or religious beliefs, [...] repugnance towards the behavior of men like David Ben Gurion, an erudite connoisseur of biblical texts, but notoriously a secularist, who is willing – when political reason demands it – to wear the ritual shawl and pray in public¹⁹.

If our concern today with Netanyahu's rhetoric is akin to the feeling of revulsion felt by Jesi almost sixty years ago, it is not because it is old and not new. If this happens, it is because yesterday as today the machine operates by referring historical current events to a mythical past, that is, transforming today's enemy into the "eternal enemy". In this way, it projects that Ur-past onto the actuality of the present in order to fabricate it. In this way, again, right-wing culture – "a truly cadaverous immobility that claims to be a perennial living force" – has never ceased to renew itself.

In other words, the machine operates by manipulating historical time: it continuously makes novelty appear, placing it in relation to an eternal phenomenon. Is it therefore invincible or indestructible? Just asking this question means in a certain sense already triggering the mechanism and therefore effectively giving in to its enchanting power. Instead, as Jesi has pointed out, "it is necessary to destroy not machines themselves, which would reform like the heads of the Hydra, but rather the situation that makes machines real and productive. The possibility of this destruction is exclusively political..."²⁰.

The answer to the question of the newness of the right wing, and to the problem and dangers of the new right, lies in the question of destruction. Every destruction that remains internal to the functioning of the machine is in fact condemned to failure, inanity, resentment or to the sacrifice of themselves and others (war fever, hatred of "strangers" and so on). However, it is possible not to be surprised by the presence of residues of right-wing culture, even where we might least expect them. It is possible to analyze the functioning of the machine, and, consequently, also see what the conditions of this functioning are. Finally, and consequently, it is possible not to be in solidarity with these conditions and with the role they assign to us. Only this possibility coincides with a *truly new* type of solidarity, which will be truly and positively destructive.

- 1 Hannah Arendt, *Lying in Politics. Reflections on the Pendragon Papers*, in *Crises of the Republic. Lying in Politics, Civil Disobedience, On Violence, Thoughts on Politics and Revolution* (New York: Harcourt Brace & Co., 1972), pp. 7–12.
- 2 Furio Jesi, *Cultura di destra. Con tre inediti e un'intervista* (Andrea Cavalletti ed) (Milan: nottetempo, 2011), p. 285. (Regarding the term Revolution, see Jesi's considerations on Rosa Luxemburg and her "concrete pessimism from the utopias of a revolution which succeeded once and for all", in Furio Jesi, 'The right time of revolution: Rosa Luxemburg and the problem of worker's democracy', in Spartakus. The symbology of revolt, (Andrea Cavalletti ed., Albarto Toscano trans.) (London: Seagull 2014), pp. 173–182).
- 3 Ibid.
- 4 Walter Benjamin, 'The Work of Art in the Age of Its Technological Reproducibility (Second Version)' in *Selected Writings, Volume 3, 1935–1938* (Howard Eiland and Michael W. Jennings eds) (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2002), p. 129.
- 5 Ibid.
- 6 See Gabriel Tarde, 'Le Public et la foule' (1898) in *L'Opinion et la foule* (Oaris: PUF, 1989 [1901]), p. 39; Elias Canetti, *Crowds and Power* (Carol Stewart trans.) (New York: Continuum, 1973 [1960]), p. 82.
- 7 Thomas Hobbes, *De Cive or The Citizen* (Sterling P. Lamprecht ed.) (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1949), p. 135.
- 8 Carl Schmitt, *Der Leviathan in der Staatslehre des Thomas Hobbes* [1938] (Köln: Hohenheim Verlag, 1982), p. 51. Unfortunately, we know from what political point of view Schmitt carried out his critical analysis of *Leviathan* in 1938.
- 9 Theodor Geiger, *Die Masse und ihre Aktion: ein Beitrag zur Soziologie der Revolutionen* (Stuttgart: Ferdinand Enke, 1926), pp. 44, 101.
- 10 Murray N. Rothbard, *Anatomy of the State* (Auburn: Ludwig von Mises Institute, [1974] 2009), p. 11.
- 11 Ibid.
- 12 Ibid., p. 42.
- 13 José Ortega y Gasset, *The Revolt of the Masses* (New York: Norton & Company, 1994 [1960]), pp. 89–90.
- 14 Massimo De Carolis, *Convenzioni e governo del mondo* (Macerata: Quodlibet, 2023) p. 180.
- 15 José Ortega y Gasset, *La rebelión de las masas*, Esapa-Calipe, Madrid 1979, pp. 130 sgg.; *The Revolt of the Masses* cit., pp. 97 sgg.
- 16 Giorgio Agamben, *The Coming Community* (Michael Hardt trans.) (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2007 [1993]), p. 63.
- 17 Marius Schattner, 'The biblical pretexts of the far right for mass expulsion', *Le Monde diplomatique* (april 2024), p. 10.
- 18 Anne Waeles, 'Zionism's cooption of Judaism', in *Le Monde diplomatique* (april 2024), p. 10. See also Amnon Raz-Krakotzkin, *Exil et souveraineté. Judaïsme, sionisme et pensée binazionale* (Carlo Ginzburg pref., Catherine Neuve-Église trans.) (Paris: La Fabrique, 2007).
- 19 Furio Jesi, 'Gli Arabi e Israele. Sionismo politico e spirituale', *Resistenza. Giustizia e libertà* (march 1968), p. 3.
- 20 Furio Jesi, 'Knowability of the Festival' (1976), in *Time and Festivity: Essays on Myth and Literature*, (Andrea Cavalletti ed., Cristina Viti trans.) (London: Seagull, 2021), p. 91.